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ABSTRACT 
 
 
MURDER IN SALONIKA, 1876: A TALE OF APOSTASY TURNED INTO 
AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 
 
Torunoğlu, Berke 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Evgeni Radushev 
June 2009 
 
The intent of this thesis is to narrate the Salonika Incident of May 1876 
and analyze this highly politicized micro case within the framework of the 19th 
century Ottoman history. In the scope of this work, the event itself and its 
aftermath will be covered in detail. 
The Salonika Incident was a Muslim public outrage caused by the 
kidnapping of a Bulgarian girl by Christians based on the reason that she wanted 
to embrace Islam, and the following public displays resulted in the murder of 
French and German consuls by a Muslim mob at May 6, 1876. The war of pen 
and ink between the Sublime Porte and the Great Powers that held the first 
accountable for the double crime was the consequence of this incident. 
Through a detailed and meticulous account of this neglected and falsely 
told episode of history, this thesis aims casting light on a virgin issue, therefore to 
 iv
contribute to the literature on the Ottoman Balkan History and inter-communal 
relations.  
Key words: Ottoman Empire, Salonika, 1876, the Balkans, Eastern 
Question, Tanzimat. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
SELANİK’TE CİNAYET, 1876: ULUSLARARASI KRİZE DÖNÜŞEN BİR 
İHTİDA HİKAYESİ 
 
Torunoğlu, Berke 
Master tezi, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Evgeni Radushev 
Haziran 2009 
 
Bu tezin amacı Selanik Vakası’nı (Mayıs, 1876) betimlemek ve bu 
fazlasıyla siyasallaştırılan mikro olayı 19. yüzyıl Osmanlı tarihi çerçevesinde 
analiz etmektir. Bu çalışma olayın kendisini, sonrasında ortaya çıkan sosyal ve 
siyasi sonuçlarını ayrıntılı bir biçimde kapsayacaktır. 
Selanik Vakası, bir Bulgar kızının ihtida etmek istemesi üzerine 
Hıristiyanlar tarafından kaçırılması sonucu oluşan Müslüman halk öfkesinin bir 
tezahürüdür ve bunu takib eden toplu gösteriler bir Müslüman güruhunun 6 Mayıs 
1876 tarihinde, Fransız ve Alman konsoloslarını öldürmesi ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu 
çifte suçun sorumlusu olarak gördükleri Bab-ı Ali ile Büyük Güçler arasındaki 
mürekkep savaşı bu vakanın sonuçlarındandır. 
 vi
Tarihin bu ihmal edilmiş veya yanlış anlatılmış perdesinin detaylı ve titiz 
bir izahı aracılığıyla bu tez, bakir kalmış bir alana ışık tutmayı ve bu sayede 
Osmanlı Balkan tarihi yazımına ve cemaatler arası ilişkiler tartışmalarına katkıda 
bulunmayı hedeflemektedir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Selanik, 1876, Balkanlar, 
Doğu Sorunu, Tanzimat. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“We know that it will furnish the matter for the most unjust accusations of 
our detractors, and that our enemies will not hesitate to take advantage of the 
opportunity to magnify the facts beyond measure, and to attach to the Salonika 
incident, of which we are far, on the other hand, from undervaluing the 
importance, an exceptionally grave character, and one which should hardly be 
attributed to it; that they will give it, in fact, the appearance of a movement 
prepared and combined deliberately as a manifestation of the hatred between 
Mussulmans and Christians, and of the intolerance of the former towards the 
other.” 
Ottoman Foreign Minister Rashid Pasha to Ottoman Ambassador at London 
Musurus Pasha May 13, 1876.1 
 
It began merely out of pure curiosity. While reading on the Balkan crises 
of 1875-1876, I stumbled upon the Salonika Incident.2 After a scan in different 
books on the Eastern Question, I came upon this same event in various sources. 
The Salonika Incident was a Muslim public outrage caused by the kidnapping of a 
Bulgarian girl by Christians based on the reason that she wanted to embrace 
Islam, and the following public displays resulted in the murder of French and 
                                                 
1 Great Britain, Parliament, Commons. Parliamentary Papers, 1876: Turkey No. 4 (1876). 
Correspondence Respecting The Murder of the French and German Consuls at Salonica, p.5 no. 
12. 
2 In the Ottoman sources and the Turkish history books the event was labeled as “Selanik Vak’ası” 
or “Selanik Hadisesi,” while the Western literature adopted the name “the Murder of French and 
German Consuls at Salonika” to refer the same event.  
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German consuls by a Muslim mob at May 6, 1876. The war of pen and ink 
between the Sublime Porte and the Great Powers that held the former accountable 
for the double crime was the consequence of this incident. The available 
presentations of the event were mostly composed of one paragraph; furthermore, 
they were contradictory, vague and superficially analyzed. Two points of view 
existed on the incident, alas the entire literature was no more than an exact 
repetition of these two; in the works written by Turkish scholars, the event was 
pictured as an injustice done by the American Consul by orchestrating the 
kidnapping of a Christian girl whose sole wish was to become a Muslim and the 
consequent reaction of the Muslim mob to save her.3 On the other hand, in the 
Western literature, this event was represented as a manifestation of Muslim 
religious fanaticism and the Ottoman inability to protect the European 
representatives at Salonika. Thus, an identification of the event called for a 
reference to the archival sources, gradually, my quest to satisfy personal curiosity 
turned into this thesis. 
 Excavating what had happened seemed like a fool’s errand at first. 
Monographic work on the Salonika Incident was actually non-existent. Yet, the 
research at the Ottoman Archives was yielding results. The Ottoman bureaucracy 
was more interested in the ramifications of the incident, the punishment of the 
                                                 
3 One of the most cited historians of the Ottoman History, Enver Ziya Karal depicts the Salonika 
Incident; “A Bulgarian girl arrived in Salonika to become a Muslim. She was kidnapped from the 
station by a man of Russian origin; Perikli Lazari [sic] who was the American Consul, and with his 
one hundred and fifty strong men. This created a great anxiety, as this event happened right before 
the eyes of a Muslim mob. A crowd gathered in front of the Government [House] for her delivery 
and demanded action from the vali (governor). […] Next day the crowd gathered at Selimpaşa 
Mosque and insisted on the delivery of the girl. Despite the warnings, French and German consuls 
went to the mosque. Upon this, the crowd demanded the girl from them, […] as a result, the 
enraged mob murdered the two consuls.” Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol.VII. (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003) p.99. The same narrative was exactly repeated even in the 
very recent literature, such as Sacit Kutlu’s book Balkanlar ve Osmanlı Devleti which was printed 
in 2007 was not immune to the replication of Karal. It even added more incorrect information; for 
instance, the American Consul was of Serbian origin in his narration. Sacit Kutlu, Balkanlar ve 
Osmanlı Devleti (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, June 2007), p.98.   
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guilty and the subsequent diplomatic crisis that followed rather than the origins of 
the event itself. I found extensive and meticulous documents in the National 
Archives of the United Kingdom; they were complementary of what I had found 
so far in the Ottoman Archives, moreover, they included inquiries and different 
accounts of the mentioned parties of the event, plus precious eye witness 
accounts. Nevertheless, to construct a more intimate acquaintance, data on the 
accused American Consul was indispensable. Despatches from United States 
Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909) surrendered these vital data. In this microfilm 
collection, along with the accounts of the American Consul of Salonika, various 
other versions of the event were present. Finally, what was left was to support my 
thesis with the accounts of the contemporary press, for that I have selected the 
Western press (the Times and New York Times) along with the Christian press of 
the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, this thesis has been the outcome of a research 
conducted in the Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul, the National Archives in 
London and the National Archives Microfilm Publications of the United States. 
 Gathered documents from the archives required a critical reading. Wishful 
thinking and reductionist attempts to resolve the incident as soon as possible were 
casting their shadows on the Ottoman documents. While picking information from 
the British documents, words of İlber Ortaylı on the possible danger by trusting 
“the megalomaniac accounts of the European diplomats who claimed that they 
were those who shaped the Ottoman policies”4 never escaped consideration. 
Dispatches of the American ministers and consuls were significant to evaluate the 
event from an outsider’s perspective during these years, but they also represented 
                                                 
4  İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, 2006),  p.25. 
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the accounts of those who were unfamiliar with the people and the dynamics of 
the Ottoman Balkans, thus entailed a more critical and mindful consideration. 
 Secondary sources demanded a more cautious approach. Mainstream 
Western literature on the 19th century Balkans is and has been dominated by 
oblique romantic nationalist history writing. There is no lack of terms like Muslim 
savagery, Turkish barbarism, oppressive Ottoman rule and downtrodden 
Christians of the Balkans. Subjectivity made any kind of violence perceived as 
norm when the Muslims were responsible, whereas violence relating to Christians 
was considered as exceptions.5 Majority of the primary sources used in Western 
literature when dealing with the Balkan crises of the 19th century, are British 
Foreign Office Reports, and -although fewer in number- correspondence among 
other European powers (i.e. Austria, France and seldom Russia). In most 
occasions, the entire crises of the Balkans were narrated without any reference 
from the Ottoman Archives, as if the Sublime Porte was not a side in these crises 
where subject matter was their lands.6 Conformity created by this mainstream 
writing, presents a mind barrier in which next generation of historians do not 
approach to the given data from a critical perspective, and do not feel an urge to 
re-interpret the events because they feel, such a reanalysis would be re-inventing 
the wheel. For the Turkish history writing, despite some exceptions, selective 
behavior of the authors when it comes to the archival materials and the repetition 
of state’s own perspective cripples the texts’ validity.  
 The purpose of this thesis is putting this neglected micro case into a 
larger conceptual framework in order to contribute to the debates on inter-
communal relations in the Balkans and Ottoman diplomatic history. The event 
                                                 
5 Ruth Miller, “The Legal History of the Ottoman Empire,” History Compass, Vol.6, No.1 (2008), 
pp.286-296,  p.291. 
6 See, David Harris, Vucinich, Jelavich. 
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itself created a great anxiety in the Ottoman Empire and abroad. It was widely 
referred by the politicians and press of the time, and it epitomized the appalling 
relations between the Sublime Porte and the European powers. Through an 
understanding of this event in the chain of crises of 1870s, one can also grasp the 
dynamics of the era which led to the unaided last stand of the Ottoman Empire 
against Russia in the War of 1877-1878. In addition to analyzing its relevance for 
the high politics, this thesis will also aim to examine the social and cultural 
dynamics that surrounded the Salonika Incident, which were invisible to the 
contemporary Europe. I assert that the timing of the political atmosphere 
combined with these inner dynamics of the Ottoman Balkans (namely; the 
question on apostasy and inter-communal relations) rendered the event from a 
common tension to an international crisis. Besides casting light on an overlooked 
and fallaciously told episode of history, I argue that by a detailed account of the 
Salonika Incident itself and the Sublime Porte’s face-saving policy my above 
assertion can find solid basis. 
 The next chapter of the thesis follows a chronological pattern; foci 
are the general perspectives of Tanzimat reforms, reaction in the Balkans, and the 
background of the hard-pressed Ottoman Empire during the Balkan crises of 
1875-1876. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a setting for the Salonika 
Incident, and pave the way for an importance issue; apostasy in the 19th century 
Ottoman Empire. The next three chapters are restricted to the event itself and they 
do not break the chain of chronology. The third chapter is reserved to unfold the 
event itself. The fourth chapter deals with the echoes of the murders at Istanbul 
and in the West. Finally, the fifth one re-visits the crime scene, wrapping the 
event as the final battles of diplomacy were resolved and the justice carried out. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
PRELUDE TO THE SALONIKA INCIDENT 
 
 
 
2.1 Tanzimat in the Balkans, 1839-1856  
 
Locating a specific date in the long history of the Ottoman Empire and 
naming it the inauguration of its reform attempts is indeed an intricate task. 
Reordering movement, dubbed as Tanzimat, almost consensually accepted as the 
name of the period when the Ottoman Empire was soaked in the reform attempts 
in order to restore its former glory. The birthday of Tanzimat was 3 November, 
1839; with the ideas proclaimed in Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu (the Hatti Sherif of 
Gülhane). How much original was the text of Gülhane is still being discussed. 
Evidently, it bore the characteristics of an Adaletnâme; a sort of document 
proclaimed upon the enthronement of a new sultan, usually promising remedy to 
the current problems and justice to entire subjects of the Empire, for this instance 
sultan was the young Abdülmecid (reigned 1839-1861). On the other hand, it was 
a revolution; as Halil İnalcik pointed out, its author Mustafa Reşid Pasha, gave the 
 7
subjects of the Empire a central role like in the modern Western states, by stating 
“people is not for the state but state is for the people.”7 The edict, although 
possessed references to the Islamic Law, was a charter of European kind, which 
heralded “Europeanization of the Ottoman superstructure.”8 
 Many tried to adopt Tanzimat as their own creation; influential foreign 
diplomats in İstanbul claimed that their directives coerced the Ottomans to 
inaugurate the Edict, others identified it as a product of Ottoman reform 
movement which began with Mahmud II.9 In any case, the certain victor, as a 
result of Gülhane, was unmistakably the Ottoman bureaucracy. The edict 
consolidated Mahmud II’s reassertion on the restriction (or abolition) of two most 
dreaded sources of insecurity for the bureaucrats of the high stratum in 1838; 
expropriation and arbitrary capital punishment.10 It can be asserted that when 
Mustafa Reşid was pronouncing the notions on the indispensability of protection 
of property and life of the Ottoman subjects, he had himself in mind before the 
subjects of the Empire. He summarized the reform as an attempt to ascertain a 
                                                 
7 For a detailed information on the analysis of Tanzimat see; Yavuz Abadan, “Tanzimat 
Fermanı’nın Tahlili,” in Tanzimat I (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), pp.31-58. Also see; 
Ogunsu, A.H., “Tanzimat ve Amillerine Umumî Bir Bakış,” Tanzimat I, İstanbul: Maarif 
Matbaası, 1940), pp.7-8; Halil İnalcık, “Adâletnâmeler,” Türk Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, Vol.2, 
No.3-4 (1965); Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-i Hümâyunu – Halil İnalcık, p.619. For a detailed 
information for the pre-Tanzimat reform attempts see, Shaw Stanford, and Ezel Kural Shaw. 
History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution and Republic, 1808-1975, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) ; Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New : the 
Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) 
8 I. Ye. Petrosyan, XIX. Asır Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Reform Hareketleri: Gelenekler ve 
Yenilikler, in “Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslarası Sempozyumu, Ankara: 31 Ekim – 3 Kasım 
1989,” (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994),  pp.21-25 
9 The destruction of the Janissary Corps and the reestablishment of central authority in the 
Balkans, by Mahmud II (1808-39) are considered the antecedents of Tanzimat. Enver Ziya Karal, 
“Tanzimattan Evvel Garplılaşma Hareketleri,” in Tanzimat I (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 
pp.13-30. 
10 “Ultimately the most important of the reforms of 1838 was Mahmud’s formal reassertion of the 
tradition of sultanic legislation (kanun) with the promulgation of special penal codes (ceza 
kanunnamesi) both for officials (memurîn) and for judges (kadıs) of the religious establishment. 
The code for officials, of “undeserved expropriation” (müsadere-i gayr-i icabiye) and nonjudicial, 
administrative punishment (siyaset-i örfiye).” Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte, 1789 – 1922,  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1980), pp.145-146. 
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système immuablement établi, in which the Sultan’s authority was checked by the 
bureaucracy. Thus begun a new period which would last until 1871; an era of 
stability and under the de-facto rule of a strong cadre of bureaucrats headed by 
three men; Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Mehmed Emin Âlî Pasha, and Keçecizade 
Mehmed Fu’ad Pasha, shaped the policies of the Empire alongside with the 
Sultan.11  
 Among promises of the Edict on the abolition of tax-farming, 
equality of all subjects regardless of religion, reform on the military service, -
considering the others were partially failed- what shook the foundation of the very 
fabric of the Ottoman society was the equality before the state and the law for the 
Muslims with non-Muslims. It was an innovation (bid’at) for the Muslims, which 
stripped them of their superior position vis-à-vis to other religions in the Empire.12 
Because their power was compromised, Muslim clergy, local land holders (i.e. 
ağas) and even governors agitated the Muslim population against the proposed 
reforms. The reforms received support from the lower classes; in some cases, the 
middle class found themselves allied with the Porte against local notables.13 On 
the other hand, the Christians in the Balkans, who were now anxious and restless, 
had great expectations. Despite the presence of those who defined these new 
equality laws as sand thrown in the eyes of the Western states to blind them of the 
Ottoman Empire’s internal problems, one of the main objectives of Tanzimat 
movement was to bind these Christian subjects to the Empire. Christians had their 
                                                 
11 Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008) p.213. Also see; 
Carter V., Ottoman Civil Officialdom: a Social History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1989). 
12 Halil İnalcık “Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-i Hümâyunu; Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal 
Tepkileri,” Belleten, Vol.28, No.112 (October, 1964) p.619. Roderic H.Davison, “The Turkish 
Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century,” in Roderic H. 
Davison Essays in the Ottoman Turkish History, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), p.121. 
13 Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and 
Community in Late Ottoman State. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. p.98. 
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own doubts about Tanzimat as well; they argued that new obligations 
counterbalanced the removed obligations. Also, their spiritual leaders were 
against Tanzimat, because of its doctrines which reduced their power over their 
followers.14  
 
 
2.2 Origins of Mass Violence in the Balkans 
 
Although they gained evident intensification after 1840s, neither the 
discontent nor the interests of the foreign powers were new phenomenon in the 
Ottoman Balkans.15 Since the havoc caused by Napoleon I, there existed some 
restlessness among these people who constituted the westernmost part of the 
Empire.16 On the other hand, foreign schemes dated back to 15th century but it 
                                                 
14 Even the slight references to the Islam in the text of the Hatt, were not enough to save it from 
the wrath of the ulema.The Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu was received with some jubilation, 
especially by the western Christian powers, although it was seen by the Russian ambassador at the 
Porte as a successful “theatrical stroke.” Salâhi R. Sonyel, “Tanzimat and Its Effect on the Non-
Muslim Subjects of the Ottoman Empire,” in Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslarası 
Sempozyumu, Ankara: 31 Ekim – 3 Kasım 1989 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), pp.353-389. 
p.367. For a detailed information on the reaction to Tanzimat in the Ottoman Empire also see; 
Halil İnalcık, “Tanzimat’ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri,” in Tanzimat, Değişim Sürecinde 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Halil İnalcık – Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (ed.)  (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 
September 2006) p.127; Salâhi R. Sonyel, “Tanzimat and Its Effect on the Non-Muslim Subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire,” in Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslarası Sempozyumu, Ankara: 31 
Ekim – 3 Kasım 1989 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994) pp.353-389, p.368. For a detailed 
information on inter-religious relations in the Ottoman Empire see; İlber Ortaylı, “Tanzimat 
Döneminde Tanassur ve Din Değiştirme Olayları,” in Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası 
Sempozyumu, Ankara: 31 Ekim – 3 Kasım 1989, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), pp.481-489, 
p.481. 
15 Stavrianos claims that; “Balkan nationalism was stimulated not only by Ottoman decline but 
also by certain economic developments that affected the entire peninsula. Outstanding among 
these developments was the breakdown of the timar landholding system established at the time of 
the conquest and its replacement with the infinitely more onerous chiflik system.” L.S. Stavrianos, 
“Antecedents to the Balkan Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century,” The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec., 1957), pp. 335-348. p.340. 
16 Despite the common knowledge of that the Greeks were not the first to initiate a nationalist 
rebellion against the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, the Serbs were before them. Stanford J. Shaw, 
“The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising, 1804-1807,” in Studies in Ottoman and Turkish 
History, Life With the Ottomans (İstanbul: Isis Press),  pp.71-94. 
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only became possible after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), that is; when the 
Ottoman Empire was put on the defensive by the Christian powers.17 In order to 
apply the clauses of Tanzimat, priority was given to the provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire where its rule was absolute; it was after these new applications bore fruits, 
they were implemented to other (and outer) provinces.18 Simultaneously, in the 
eastern and western provinces of the Empire, revolts broke out, but the 
characteristics of the revolts in those provinces were dissimilar. In the Eastern 
Anatolia (Van, Hakkari, Erzurum) local Muslim landlords who were de-facto 
rulers of the region in the name of sultans, rose against the applications of the new 
taxes, in favor of the old ways.19 Reactions against Tanzimat in the Balkan 
Peninsula came not so long after its inauguration. In the Western Balkans, 
Christian and Muslim landlords (i.e. Christian çorbacıs, Muslim ağas) rebelled 
under the same motivations as it was in the Eastern Anatolia, but these 
insurrections swiftly turned into nationalist-political movements, in which 
external powers to the highest degree got themselves interested in. Tanzimat 
coincided with the increasing interests of the Great Powers in the Ottoman 
Balkans hence the Peninsula became the center of their attention and power 
politics.20 These powers considered in their rights to intervene into the internal 
affairs of the Sublime Porte, perhaps due to the impression of a right to do so 
given to them by Tanzimat itself.  
Risings in the Ottoman Balkans, right after Tanzimat, shared some 
common points regarding their underlying motives; they were a result of 
                                                 
17 Mark Mazower, The Balkans, (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000) p.79. 
18 Musa Çadırcı, “Tanzimat’ın Uygulanışında Karşılaşılan Güçlükler,” in Hakki Dursun Yildiz 
(ed.), 150. Yilinda Tanzimat (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), pp. 97-104. 
19 Musa Çadırcı, Tanzimat Sürecinde Ülke Yönetimi, Tülay Ercoşkun (ed.), (Ankara, İmge 
Yayınevi, 2007), p.193. 
20 There was no single monolithic definition of the interests of the Great Powers, often Habsburg’s 
interests conflicted with Russia, or Britain had totally different policy to follow of their own. 
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deprivation of strong control of the Sublime Porte, frustration of the population 
due to over-taxation, and oppression of the Muslim and Christian overlords who 
considered the peasants on their lands nothing more than slaves bought.21 
Moreover, extensive banditry, Russian penetration in the area since the War of 
1828-1829, and the encouraging examples set by independent Greece and Serbia 
promoted the tension in the Peninsula.22 Nevertheless, the whole Ottoman legal 
system in the area did not seem tyrannical until the arrival of new ideas and 
standards from Europe.23 Tanzimat was supposed to be a medicine to Nationalism 
which begun to plague the Balkans.24 Yet, the chronic problems endured, and the 
abusive interpretations of Tanzimat provided more reasons for the insurrections. 
 From many instances, revolts of Niš (1841) and Vidin (1850) are two 
typical examples of rising in the Balkans that stemmed from the implementations 
of Tanzimat reforms.25 Despite the points of Tanzimat dictating the abolition of 
tax-farming and multiple taxes, the local Christian peasantry was forced to pay the 
old taxes to the local, and the new poll-tax to central authority. Moreover, the 
Muslims who were exempted from several taxes in time of previous sultans, 
refused to pay the new ones. In both cases, Muslim landlords wanted to extract 
more from the Christian peasantry who were under them, in response faced with 
resistance from the peasants who stated that “people are not revolting against the 
                                                 
21 Halil İnalcık, “Tanzimat’ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri,” in Tanzimat, Değişim Sürecinde 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Halil İnalcık – Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (ed.)  (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 
September 2006), p.133. 
22 Russian penetration was not a new phenomenon during the War of 1828-29.  Since the reign of 
Peter the Great and during the 18th century, Russian advance was felt by the Porte and the 
inhabitants of the Balkans. 
23 Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic 
Review 4, Vol.1-2 (1997-1998), pp.30-75. 
24 Mustafa Reşid Pasha believed that, rights and equality before the law would eventually halt the 
constant demands of the Christian subjects and prevent them to seek external aid from other 
Christian powers. Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, pp.3-4. Mark Pinson, “Ottoman 
Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period: The Revolts in Nish (1841) and Vidin (1850),” Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 103-146, p.105. 
25 See Ahmet Uzun, Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler: Niş İsyanı Üzerine Ayrıntılı Bir İnceleme 
(İstanbul: Eren, 2002) 
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legitimate government of the Sultan rather they want that the benevolent terms of 
the Hatti Sherif of Gulhane be faithfully and exactly carried out.”26 Ottoman 
authorities fearing a spillover of the insurrections in the whole of the Balkans 
were inclined to stern measures. Irregular auxiliaries;  Başıbozuks27, whom were 
mostly composed of Albanians and Circassians, being used to suppress the 
rebellions, but like double bladed sword, they pillaged and looted towns while 
eradicating the sources of the unrests.28 The atrocities committed were turning the 
Western public opinion against the Ottomans while paving the way for self-
declared protector of Ottoman Christians; Russia, a right to intervene. These two 
scenarios were neither the first nor the last in the 19th century Balkan history; 
repetition of this pattern (rebellion – reaction – violence – foreign intervention) 
became similar to the torture of Sisyphus, in which the Porte was perpetually 
locked. As a result, the Peninsula became to be known as a cradle of ethnic 
violence.  
 
 
                                                 
26 Mark Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period: The Revolts in Nish (1841) and 
Vidin (1850),” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 103-146, p.109. 
27 Although there was no single definition of başıbozuk, James J. Reid compiled these definitions 
from the Ottoman Officers themselves; “Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha contrasted the bashi-bozuk with 
the regular army soldier. To him, the bashi bozuk was the exact opposite of the nizâm soldier. That 
is, he was untrained, undisciplined, and uncontrollable civilian. […] Ahmed Mukhtâr Pasha, 
commander of the Ottoman army of Anatolia in 1877, gave a detailed description of the troops 
who served under his command. […] [He has] distinguished between troop levies made directly by 
the Ottoman government and those made by a military broker not in government service. […] 
Mahmûd Celaleddin Pasha wrote about Ottoman Military operations during the revolt in 
Herzegovina during 1875-1876. […] The operation followed the usual pattern in which 
permanently established bands of irregulars maneuvered in a campaign as scouts, skirmishers, 
advance guards, and the cavalry screen of the regular army troops.” James J. Reid, Crisis of the 
Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878 (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), pp.119-121. 
28 Halil İnalcık, “Tanzimat’ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri,” in Tanzimat, Değişim Sürecinde 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Halil İnalcık – Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (ed.)  (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 
September 2006)p.144. 
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2.3 Organized Violence; Russian Penetration and War in the Balkans 
 
The Russian interests in the Ottoman lands were not excluded to the 
Balkans; Russian expansionism also targeted the Caucasus, Iran and even India 
for its frontier. The stereotyped Russian foreign policy of its desire to capture 
warm water ports of the Ottoman Empire was more or less factual.29 From the 
establishment of their diplomatic relations with intervals “tsars and sultans fought 
against each other in a seemingly endless series of wars between the seventeenth 
and twentieth centuries, until both disappeared.”30 The War of 1828-182931 
manifested the power of Russia when its army managed to seize the old capital of 
the Ottomans, Edirne. With this war, Russia also discovered (or re-discovered) its 
kinsmen living in the Balkans.32 Even though, these Slavonic peoples were tools 
                                                 
29 Count B.C. Münnich, a friend of Peter the Great claimed in 1762, “from the moment of the first 
attack on Azov until the hour of his death, [Peter’s] grand design... had always been to conquer 
Constantinople, to chase the infidel Turks and Tatars out of Europe, and thus to reestablish the 
Greek Monarchy.” Under Catherine the Great the ambition gained a name “The Greek Project,” in 
favoring its fulfillment Catherine named her grandson Constantine and tutored him in Greek 
language, dreaming one day he will be the first Tsar of Constantinople. Hugh Ragsdale 
“Evaluation the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project, Slavonic 
and East European Review, Vol.66:1 (January, 1988), pp.91-117, p.93. 
30 Donald Quataert, Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
p.5.  
31 It was 7th May 1828 when the Russian Army crossed Pruth River and marched further into the 
Ottoman lands. In the eyes of Europe, the fall of the Ottoman Empire was imminent. On the other 
hand, Nicholas I was confident about a swift victory, by pressing on the Capital and forcing Sultan 
down to his knees. Politically, the conflict sparked following the Naval Battle of Navarino (20 
October 1827), the Sublime Porte found the decision of European powers on the Greek Revolt 
unacceptable and furthermore accused St. Petersburg siding with the Greek Rebels in consequence 
interfering to the internal affairs of the Porte. The Tsar wanted to force Sultan Mahmud II for a 
favorable agreement with Russia; allowance of passages from the straits for Russian Navy. 
Nevertheless, Greek Card was no more than a political one, as the Tsar had no sympathy for the 
Greeks and even considered them a despicable nation. Nonetheless, he shared the idea of the 
European states that an independent Greek state was required in the vicinity. The war was 
disastrous for the Ottoman Empire, but upon realizing the danger to the Straits posed by Russia, 
Britain had to reconsider its foreign policy.  See, Baron von Moltke, The Russian in Bulgaria and 
Rumelia in 1828 and 1829 (London: John Murray, Albermarle Street, 1854). Naci Çakın, Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi Osmanlı – Rus Harbi (1828 – 1829) (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 
1978) 
32 Panslavism was not a Russian monopolized ideology, as a matter of fact it was first put forward 
by Czechs and Slovaks at the beginning of the 19th century. Sándor Kostya, Pan-Slavism, Anne 
Fay Atzel (ed.), (Danubian Press Inc., 1981). For a general information on Panslavism and its 
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for the Russian politics in the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula, it would also be 
false to dismiss entirely the Russian sincerity.33 Without any doubt, the Russian 
public opinion was in favor of freeing their “Slav brothers”; especially after 1856, 
it turned into a public movement with the embracement of Panslavism ideology.34 
But the inconsistency in the Russian rhetoric was evident. While Tsar Nicholas I 
(reigned 1825-55) was playing the role of “Gendarme of Europe” by suppressing 
nationalistic uprisings (i.e. of Hungary at 1849) thus gaining the sobriquet “Nick 
the Stick”, in the meantime he advocated and promoted the separatist movements 
in the Balkans.35 
 Around 1840’s, Russian Empire considered itself closer than ever to its 
ages long ambition; relations with Britain was warm with their rapprochement, the 
decay of the Ottoman power was evident, and the Tsar’s pride and joy; his army, 
was at top form. Thus, Tsar Nicholas did not hesitate to grasp the opportunity to 
wage war against the Porte when the crisis of the Holy Places occurred.36 In the 
Crimean War, Tsar’s miscalculated action cost his empire dearly; Britain entered 
the war on the side of the Porte not to relinquish the control of the Straits to 
Russia; France to obtain glory and prestige sided with the British who were joined 
by Piedmont. Russia was defeated in a war mostly confided to Crimean Peninsula, 
                                                                                                                                     
effects on the Ottoman Empire see; Akdes Nimet Kurat, “Panslavizm,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve 
Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol.XI, No.2-4, (Ankara, 1953), p.242. 
33 For a general account of Russia’s Balkan policies see; Barbara Jelavich, Russia's Balkan 
Entanglements, 1806-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
34 Hans Kohn, “The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe,” The Review of Politics,Vol. 23, 
No. 3 (Jul., 1961), pp. 323-333. p.323. 
35 Oscar J. Hammen, “Free Europe versus Russia 1830-1854,” American Slavic and Eastern 
European Review, Vol. 11 No.1  (Feb., 1952), p.27-41. 
36 The origins of the Crimean War shaded as they are, still being debated. What is evident is the 
crisis on the Holy Places, sacred sites of Christendom in Ottoman-ruled Palestine, between Russia, 
who backed Orthodox Greek Church, and France who supported Catholic priests. “Although none 
of the powers sought war, the tsar’s clumsy diplomacy, the intransigence of the sultan and the 
machinations of Stratford Canning, Britain’s Russophobe minister to Constantinople, all helped 
transform a ‘quarrel of monks’ into the first major clash among the powers since Waterloo.” David 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, the Cambridge History of Russia, v. II Imperial Russia, 1689–
1917, Dominic Lieven (ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.560. 
 15
and afterwards with the Treaty of Paris had to demilitarize the Black Sea. The 
Crimean System established as result of this peace, which gave the Porte a 
breather and at the same time compelled Russia to steer for more subtle means; 
diplomacy and agitation, in order to achieve their goals in the Balkans.  
 The Crimean War had an enormous significance for the history of the 
Ottoman Balkans. Islahat Fermanı (The Reform Edict of 1856) was promulgated 
just before the Paris Treaty, to receive the good graces of the European powers in 
the conference. If Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu of 1839 was for the Muslims, this 
new one was clearly for the Christians.37 It came into being from Christian hands 
for the Christians; since there was no doubt that the British Ambassador “Little 
Sultan” Stratford Canning was behind it.38 It reaffirmed the vague points of 
Gülhane and clearly emphasized the equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim 
populations of the Empire. It was also an attempt to bar the way to European 
powers to interfere into the internal affairs of the Porte by using the inequality of 
the Christians as an excuse. With the aid of the Hatt-ı Humayun of 1856, during 
the peace conference, the Porte even secured a formal promise from the parties 
not to mingle in Ottoman’s own affairs.39 Perhaps most importantly the Porte -as a 
consequence of Âlî Pasha’s clever maneuvers- with securing the endorsements of 
the European powers, was welcomed to the European concert, thus making it an 
integral and indivisible part of Europe.40 
                                                 
37 Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008), p.217. 
38 Şükrü Hanioğlu quotes the following about Canning; “Fu’ad Pasha is said to have remarked on 
the appointment of Tanzimat architect Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s son, Ali Galib Pasha, as foreign 
minister on Canning’s recommendation in 1856: “We too have the Holy Trinity. Reşid Pasha is the 
Father, Ali Galib Pasha is the Son, and Lord Stratford [Canning] is the Holy Ghost.” Şükrü 
Hanioğlu, Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2008), p.84. 
39 Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye, v.1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 
1960) p.392. 
40 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), p.85. 
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2.4 The Post Crimean War System, 1856-1871 
 
An interval of twenty year after the Crimean War (1856-1876) was free 
from armed conflict with other states for the Porte’s account. The awaited respite 
did not come to the lands of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, with the Hatt-ı 
Humayun of 1856 and its subsequent regulations, Christians of the Porte became 
more equal with the Muslims, and with the European states championing their 
rights, they became sort of a privileged population in the Empire. Many crypto-
Christians were declaring their true faith, while others through acquiring their 
passports, were seeking protection of Great Powers that they never set foot in their 
lives.41 For instance, after the 1860s in Beyoğlu district of Istanbul, there were 
over a hundred Ottoman Greek families carrying United States’ passports.42 
Conservative Muslims resented the reforms and the elevation of Christians’ status 
in the Empire. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha43 quoted the Muslim’s expression of their 
discontent after 1856 with these words; “We have lost our holy national (milliyet) 
rights of which we have earned through the bloods of our forefathers. Henceforth, 
people of Islam are stripped of their holy right. Today, is a day of mourn and tears 
for the Muslims’ account.”44 Namık Kemal, acted as a messenger of the Muslim 
bitterness, “by pointing out that the Christian population of the empire, having 
been favored by special protection of the Great Powers, had wrested more 
                                                 
41 Roderic H. Davison, “The Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the 
Nineteenth Century,” Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History 1774-1923 (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1990), p122. 
42 Microcopy no.46 Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 1818-1909, Roll 30 v.29. 
43 Perspectives of Ahmed Cevdet indeed are mirrors for the Porte’s and the masses own ideology. 
Christoph Neumann claims that he was a devotee of Mustafa Reşid’s legacy to the death. 
Neumann adds that Ahmed Cevdet called by many names; for some he was reformer, for some an 
Islamist or a follower of Ib Haldun’s philosophy. Christoph Neumann, “Tanzimat Bağlamında 
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa’nın Siyasî Düşünceleri,” in Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası, 
Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001). pp.83-5. 
44 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezâkir 1-12 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p.68. 
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privilege […] in a country which already had granted them equal status.”45 
Mostly, the protests of the Muslims, which were manifested as acts of violence, 
echoed in the Western press. Murder of French and British consuls by the 
Muslims mobs in Jeddah in 1858 was one of them. It was solved via British 
gunboat diplomacy; an act of violation of the Porte’s authority on its soil, by the 
same Britain who was a signatory side in the Paris Treaty and welcomed the Porte 
as its equal. In 1860, at Mount Lebanon, Muslim Druzes and Christian Maronites 
fell into conflict, resulted in a terrible loss of life for the latter’s account.46 France 
acting as the protector of Catholic Maronites intervened by sending troops. In 
both events, the violence was attributed to the entire Muslim population of the 
Ottoman Empire, labeling them with the stereotypes of fanaticism and barbarism. 
These events happened right at the time when French public opinion was 
questioning the justification of the Crimean War in which France casualties 
surmounted its other allies, and while British ended a bloody struggle against 
rebelling Muslims and Hindus of India. While Britain was shocked by every 
exceptional case of violence in which Christians were hurt on the Ottoman soil, in 
the mean time, it readily justified the level of violence during the Indian Revolts 
of 1857, even Charles Dickens called for a genocide for rebelling Orientals in 
India.47 
                                                 
45 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), p.37. 
46 Ussama Makdisi, “Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov., 2002), pp. 601-617, pp.601-
602. 
47 It was the comment of Peter Ackroyd, Dickens biographer, who made the following comment; 
“It is not often that a great novelist recommends genocide” due to “[t]he events of 1857–59 on the 
Indian subcontinent surprised and shook Britons. In the face of the seemingly maniacal uprising, 
Britons, almost to a person, reacted explosively. In an October 1857 letter, Dickens wrote: “I wish 
I were Commander in Chief in India. . . . I should do my utmost to exterminate the Race upon 
whom the stain of the late cruelties rested . . . to blot it out of mankind and raze it off the face of 
the Earth.” Priti Joshi, “Mutiny Echoes: India, Britons, and Charles Dickens's "A Tale of Two 
Cities"” Nineteenth Century Literature, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Jun., 2007), pp. 48-87. 
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The Balkan Peninsula was also still boiling. The Tanzimat reforms were 
unable to penetrate into some parts of the Balkans.48 Banditry and mayhem caused 
by armed bands of the Christian population, was countered by the notorious 
başıbozuks’ terror. Understanding the history of banditry and violence in the 
Balkans is essential to discern the image of the Porte in the West. The romantic 
figures of haiduk, klephte, and armatoles, were brigands for the Porte but they 
were also heroes for the Balkan nationalistic/national pantheon.49 They were 
closely related to bards and heroes for national romanticism, although there 
existed a thin line between a cutthroat and a freedom fighter through their 
exploits; they had begun to symbolize resistance against the available authority; 
the Ottoman rule.50 They were mostly connected with the peasant masses who had 
their own type of antagonism shaped along ethnic-religious lines, while the upper 
strata of them (i.e. community leaders, elites educated abroad in Austria and 
Russia) were considering the Ottoman rule as alien and exploiting, hence 
gradually they supported the movements financially and ideologically.51 Thus, 
violence became a torch in the hands of these brigands and the Porte, which set 
the whole Balkans in flames. During the period, in the Ottoman Christian press 
there was an abundance of articles related to the violence directed against 
Christians by Muslims.52 The movements of the Balkan Christians were powerless 
on their own to carve their freedom from the hands of the Ottoman Empire. “They 
lacked the organization, leadership, ability or will” as Mazower puts it, to stand up 
                                                 
48 Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1992) 
49 Mark Mazower, The Balkans, (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), p.106. 
50 John MacDonald, Turkey and the Eastern Question, (London: T.C. & E. C. Jack, 1912), pp.39-
42. 
51 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Jul., 1972), pp. 243-281, p.249. 
52 Marina Sakali, “The Image of the Turks / Muslims in the Ottoman Greek Press 1830-1860,” 
Balkan Studies, V.38 (1997), p.128. 
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alone against the weakening Ottoman power.53 Balkan peoples thus tried to ally 
themselves with a European great power of their liking; Austria-Hungary and 
Russia were ready and able. Except Serbia, they relinquished their hard-earned 
sovereignty to European princes for their support.54  
In the meantime, the Sublime Porte, with all its sincerity tried to eradicate 
the roots of the disturbances in the Balkans also through peaceful means. While 
the Cretan Crisis was at peak Âlî Pasha, in his memorandum expressed the 
necessity to hasten the reforms of equality in non-Muslims’ favor, with the help of 
what he hoped that would no longer be revolutionaries. While Fu’ad Pasha firmly 
believed that, the liberties bestowed on non-Muslims would dull their separatist 
insistences.55 Their attempts materialized in the assertion of a new supra-national 
identity of Osmanlılık (Ottomanism). Those who were born on the Ottoman soil, 
under the umbrella of Osmanlılık, were equal regardless of the identity or religion. 
This supra-national identity failed to replace the romantic desires of one’s 
assuming its own separate national title.56 What the Ottoman reformers failed to 
grasp was that in general the Ottoman Christians were not interested in being an 
Ottoman -Osmanlı. Since the penetration of the trends emphasizing critical 
thinking about the problems of the daily life, masses were inclined to hold the 
reins of their life. Napoleon III, boldly declared that, “a government should 
release a nationality that does not want it[s rule].”57 It was a wishful thinking of 
the Ottoman reformists, to attempt to bind these peoples to the core, considering 
                                                 
53 Mark Mazower, The Balkans (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), p.81. 
54 İlber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Milliyetçilik (En Kalıcı Miras),” in XII. Türk Tarih 
Kongresi Ankara 4-8 Ekim 1999, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2002),  p.5. 
55 Roderic H. Davison, “The Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the 
Nineteenth Century,” Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History 1774-1923 (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1990), p.118. 
56 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State,” 1789-1908, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Jul., 1972), pp. 243-281, p.261. 
57 Napoleon III said this before waging war against Austria for Italian freedom. Ahmed Cevdet 
Paşa, Ma’rûzât (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980),  p.42. 
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that they could not resort to full scale force -like other Great Powers did- to 
suppress them. While the revolutionaries had Western patronage, the Porte, 
Niyazi Berkes counts “was without an expert cadre of accountant, officer, soldier, 
engineer, doctor, economist, teacher or judge” to accomplish its daring reform 
plans. 
 
 
2.5 The Ottoman Finances Crumbles as Its Image Hits Bottom  
 
In 1870, the relative atmosphere of peace in the international arena was 
beginning to shatter. The former allies at the Crimean War were losing their 
interests in preserving the unity of the Ottoman Empire. Russophobia which was 
one of the main catalysis behind the war against Russia, was gradually 
diminishing in Britain. Daily News wrote in November 1870;  
[Britain’s] policy of the Crimean War, and […] the statesmanship of that 
period would probably have been condemned. Wars for the preservation of 
the balance of power, for restricting the growth of a strong state and 
invigorating the infirmity of a weak one, are felt to be out of date. The 
anti-Russian feeling in England, dying away under the influence of new 
ideas of policy, was fast becoming an obsolete prejudice.58 
 
Hanioğlu picks an exemplary account of George Villiers, one of the 
architects of the Crimean system, “as people [came to] know more about the 
united ignorance and stupidity of the Mahomedans who squat in some of the 
fairest regions of the world in order to prevent their being productive.”59Anti-
Turkish feelings of the public opinion were manipulated among rival parties to 
                                                 
58 W.E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855-71, (London: Macmillian & co ltd 
New York St Martin’s Press, 1963), p.3. 
59 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, (Princeton N.J., Princeton 
University Press, 2008), p.82. 
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find support for their vision of the British foreign policy.60 At 1870, Gladstone 
remarked; “the whole policy of Crimean War is not almost universally and very 
unduly depreciated, and the idea of another armed intervention on behalf of 
Turkey is ridiculed.”61    
In Europe, with the appearance of a united Germany through its decisive 
victory against France, the balance of power was tipped for the Porte’s 
disadvantage. Suddenly the world seemed smaller to the Great Powers. 
Technological advancement made it easier to conquer lands over long distances, 
and new means of communication facilitated its rule. Moreover, faith in the 
advancing technology convinced the contemporary powers that ostensible barren 
lands might one day become exploitable.62 With the opening of the Suez Canal, 
British interests were fixed directly to controlling the road to India to secure it. 
Russia seized this opportunity to achieve its desire to remove the last obstacle put 
on its way after the Paris Treaty; the naturalization of the Black Sea.63 Besides its 
strategic importance, it was also perceived by Russia an insult to their national 
honor. During the Franco-Prussian war, Russia secured the backing of Prince 
Bismarck who had his own agenda, and initiated diplomatic pressure on the 
abolition of the Neutrality of the Black Sea. While whole Europe was plunged 
into the infamous War Scare, Russia claiming that it was violated by the Porte in 
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New York St Martin’s Press, 1963), p.3. 
62 Dominic Lieven, “Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918; Power, Territory, Identity,” Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Apr., 1999),  p.166. 
63 The Black Sea rendered neutral and open to trade ships, all the shipyards at the coast was to be 
demolished and construction of new ones was forbidden. This point of the treaty gave the Porte an 
evident advantage, since it may enter the Black Sea with its fleets from the Straits but Russia 
cannot. Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye, v.1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 
1960), p.120. 
 22
many instances, managed to make the point abolished with a fait accompli.64 The 
Porte turned Britain for help, but the British announced that they had no material 
capacity or public support to help. The fall of the Crimean System was no shock 
for British account since when asked in 1856, Lord Palmerson estimated that 
stipulations would last only ten years.65  
1871 also marked great changes for the inner mechanics of the Porte. Âlî 
Pasha, the last protégé of Mustafa Reşid, died in the same year. Upon hearing the 
news, Sultan Abdülaziz (reigned 1861-1876) declared that “at last I am a free 
man.”66 Abdülaziz became a believer of the supremacy autocracy over liberalism 
after victory of Prussia over France.67 While tightening his grip on the control of 
the Empire, he appointed Mahmud Nedim as grand vizier. The new grand vizier 
was a failure of the Ottoman bureaucracy personified; Ahmed Cevdet Pasha 
dubbed him as the demolisher of the state’s traditions and foundations.68 Mahmud 
Nedim Pasha’s first grand vizierate period was marked with constant shuffling of 
the bureaucrats in order to consolidate his rule. He rendered the state almost 
unworkable. He was also the main factor behind the opposition of the public 
opinion to Sultan Abdülaziz. “In the past” Ahmed Cevdet noted;  
                                                 
64 One of the main actors in the abolition of the Neutrality of the Black Sea was Ignatiev, Sumner 
writes; “As regards the Straits, Ignatyev held that Russia must command them as much for the 
security of her Black Sea coast-line as for her political and economic expansion. She must be 
master of Constantinople by one of two means, either by complete diplomatic predominance there 
as was achieved between I87I and I875, or by direct conquest if the opposition of the Turks and 
the Powers rendered the former policy impossible. Ignatyev seems to have conceived of the 
peaceful policy of dominance over the Sultan, witha harmless Turkey and a de facto Russian 
control of the Straits, as an interim course to be pursued until such time as a radical solution of the 
eastern question would have to be found involving the disruption of the Ottoman Empire in 
Europe.” B.H. Sumner, “Ignatyev at Constantinople, 1864-1874. I” The Slavonic and East 
European Review, Vol. 11, No. 32 (Jan., 1933), pp. 341-353, p.343. 
65 W.E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855-71, (London: Macmillian & co ltd 
New York St Martin’s Press, 1963), p.3. 
66 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), p.279. 
67 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, cilt.VII Islahat Fermanı Devri (1861 – 1876), (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, 2003) p.68. 
68 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Ma’rûzât, (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980), p.210. 
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The high bureaucrats use to act as a curtain between the Sultan and people, 
they use to adopt unavoidable decisions that would lead to public 
opposition as their own, and they bestowed the nice ones to the Sultan, 
thus, the target of the oppositions use to be the bureaucrats and nobody 
would talk against the Sultan himself. As soon as the disturbances peaked 
the bureaucrat would be removed from the office and replaced to a new 
post, and when the issue was forgotten he would be reinserted. But 
Mahmud Nedim imposed all of his actions even the bad ones to 
Abdülaziz.69  
   
This conduct of Mahmud Nedim would eventually lead to his and the Sultan’s 
downfall. Although Mahmud Nedim remained as his favorite, the Sultan rotated 
six grand viziers in three years.70  
The financial crisis of 1873-1875 was the last straw on the dwindling 
Ottoman economy. Since the Crimean War, the Ottoman Treasury was borrowing 
money from the European powers. First of the foreign loans were taken during the 
reign of Sultan Abdülmecid at 1854.71 Although Abdülmecid resisted the idea of a 
foreign loan, he eventually cave in to cover the war expenses. As time passed, it 
became habitual, as new loans were taken just for daily issues.72 But after 1871, 
with the decline of the Ottoman terms of trade vis-à-vis other Western states, the 
                                                 
69 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Ma’rûzât (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980), p.226. 
70 Alan Palmer, the Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, (London: John Murray, 1993), p.139. 
71 “In 1854, during the Crimean War, the Ottoman government began to sell long-term bonds in 
the European financial markets and this soon became the most important means of dealing with 
the recurring budgetary difficulties. In the early stages of this process, the Ottoman government 
was supported by its British counterpart and wartime ally which guaranteed the first bond issue 
against the Ottoman annual receipts from the Egyptian tribute. In the following two decades, the 
Ottoman government borrowed large sums in London, Paris, Vienna, and elsewhere under 
increasingly unfavorable terms. The net proceeds of these issues were directed almost from 
bimetallism to the ``limping gold standard'' entirely towards current expenditures, however. Only a 
small fraction was spent on infrastructure investment and on increasing the capacity to payback. 
By the second half of the 1860s, Ottoman finances had deteriorated to the point where new bond 
issues had become necessary to maintain the debt payments.” Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History 
of the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.213-214. For a detailed account 
on the relations of the Porte and Britain on the borrowings see; National Archives F(oreign) 
O(ffice) 881-3248, Lord Tenterden to the Secretary of Treasury, July 13, 1877. 
72 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Ma’rûzât, (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980), p.7. 
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financial situation became unmistakably dire.73 Despite the time of troubles, the 
Sultans’ extravagant spending continued. From the Empire’s sum of incomes, a 
portion of 10% was transferred to Abdülaziz’s own treasury which was reserved 
to his harem and personal spending.74 On top of all these, a famine struck 
Anatolian provinces, and even Istanbul did not manage to escape it.75 
Nevertheless, the real catastrophe was manmade. Mahmud Nedim Pasha, listening 
to the ill advises of Russian Ambassador Ignatiev, made a surprising decision and 
announced the Porte unilaterally reduced debt payments by half in October 1875. 
It shocked the foreign Ottoman bond holders, as a consequence the anti-Turkish 
feelings peaked, especially in Britain, an insightful remark was made “that 
European creditors had no problem with imperfect government in Istanbul when it 
paid them seven percent, but discovered all its iniquities when the rate [was] 
reduced to three.”76 Hanioğlu adds, “articles in the British and French press 
accused the Ottoman government of foolishly squandering European investments; 
and some even questioned the desirability of ‘continued Ottoman existence in 
Europe’.”77 There was still some freefall for the Ottoman image in Europe until it 
hit the rock bottom.   
 
  
                                                 
73 “Mostly as a result of the entry of American wheat in the international markets, world wheat 
prices declined by more than 60 percent between 1873 and 1894, a rate of decline twice as rapid as 
the decline in the prices of Ottoman nonwheat exports. Ottoman government finances were also 
hurt because the government derived more than a quarter of its revenues from agricultural 
production in a country where close to 90 percent of all land under cultivation was in cereals.” 
Şevket Pamuk, “The Ottoman Empire in the "Great Depression" of 1873-1896,” The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 44, No. 1, (Mar., 1984), pp. 107-118, p.111. 
74 Çoşkun Çakır, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Maliyesi, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, October 2001), 
p.212. 
75 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), p.301. 
76 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, (Princeton N.J., Princeton 
University Press, 2008), p.92. 
77 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, (Princeton N.J., Princeton 
University Press, 2008), p.92. 
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2.6 1876, the Year of Three Sultans78 
 
By the end of 1875, the Ottoman image was in shambles, its economy in 
ruins, and soldiers, sailors, civil officials had not been paid for eight months. At 
late, news of revolt from Herzegovina reached to Istanbul. The reason of revolts 
seemed to be the failed crops of the recent year and the unchanged ratio of tax 
despite the fact that granaries were empty. But, it suddenly gained a national 
character, and reinforced from Austrian Croatia, and Serbia.79 Austria and Russia 
overtly condemned the rebels but covertly supplied them with material and morale 
support.80 At the capital, Ignatiev was advising Mahmud Nedim to exercise soft 
measures against the rebels, and managed stall him for five months. Redif (reserve 
troops) were called to arms, but other than that Mahmud Nedim’s rule showed 
total mismanagement of the whole crisis. The telegrams coming from the Pasha of 
the revolting Nevesin were ignored, and dismissed as personal feud between 
officers.81 In contrast to the military authorities of Austria, who wanted to seize 
the opportunity to annex Bosnia, foreign minister Andrassy was cool to the rebels; 
for him, disturbance on the frontier was forlorn occasion, because he hoped to 
discourage Russian intrigue in the Balkans and the growing Panslavism.82 Thus, 
he took the initiative where Mahmud Nedim hesitated, and proposed a joint note, 
to the Porte and the rebels. The grand vizier, eventually accepted a foreign 
interference to the revolt, whereas after seeing the full attention of Europe, the 
                                                 
78 The title refers to the fall of Abdülaziz, enthronement of Murad V and after him Abdülhamid II. 
Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), p.311. 
79 no. 152, Acting Consul Freeman to Earl of Derby, Bosna Serai April 14 1876. 
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February 2004), p.257. 
81 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezâkir 40 Tetimme, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p.147.  
82 David Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878; The First Year, (Archon 
Books, 1936), p.69. 
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rebels demanded more, hence they rejected Andrassy Note. Mahmud Nedim’s 
reputation along with his sultan, in the eyes of Muslim subjects, weighed down by 
a hideous act of accepting foreign meddling, and even after accepting it, gaining 
no beneficial results. 
 The rebellion thus spread in the Balkans. Seeing the Porte unable to 
suppress the disorders, discontent Christians of the Balkans were convinced to 
take up arms. Finally, feeling cornered, Mahmud Nedim ordered Ahmed Muhtar 
Pasha to sweep the rebels. Results came in April 1876, as Ahmed Muhtar made 
his victorious entrance to Nikşik.83 In the revolting sancaks (provinces) 
başıbozuks were recruited and released on the insurgents, while the local Muslim 
begun to arm themselves.84 Atrocities of these başıbozuks were written in 
European press; while correspondents were roaming in the Balkans for more 
stories to incite their audiences, thus sell their papers.85 
 
 
2.7 From Apostasy to the High Politics 
 
While all eyes were fixed on the Balkans and the entire Europe was talking about 
the Muslim barbarism, a sudden violent incident happened at a place not far from 
                                                 
83 Great Britain, Parliament, Commons. Parliamentary Papers, 1876: Turkey No.3 (1876). 
Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Turkey and the Insurrection in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.no.182, Ali Pasha to Musurus Pasha to Earl of Derby, Mostar 30 April 1876. 
84 Mihailo D. Stojanovic, the Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878, (Cambridge at the 
University Press, 1939), p.78. also see; Great Britain, Parliament, Commons. Parliamentary 
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Insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina no.185, Acting Consul Freeman to Earl of Derby, Bosna 
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85 For Başıbozuk atrocities see; M. Eugene Schuyler to the Department of State,  Despatches from 
United States Ministers to Turkey (1818-1909), Roll 12 v.12 (September 13 1876 – August 22, 
1877), no.39. Lazzaro to Schuyler, ,  Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey (1818-
1909), Roll 12 v.12 (September 13 1876 – August 22, 1877), no.84. 
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the revolts; the Murder of French and German consuls at Salonika. It was argued 
that the event was a materialization of Muslim bitterness during these years of 
constant crises, but I assert it was not simply a reaction to the grim picture in the 
Empire. To unearth the roots of the problem the question on apostasy must be 
defined.86  
Apostasy was a constant phenomenon in the Ottoman Balkans, conversion 
to Islam started with the arrival of Ottomans to the Peninsula and continued until 
late 19th century. What was added to it after Tanzimat was the foreign 
interference. While many non-Muslims claiming foreign protection the consulates 
started to act as states within states in almost every corner of the Ottoman Empire. 
These consulates were clearly mingled in the inter-communal affairs such as 
apostasy. British Consul of Sarajevo William Richard Holmes, in his report dated 
1871, defined the missions of their consulates as “monitor the relations of the 
mixed and hostile races of Turkey.”87  
 In the cases of apostasy from Christianity to Islam, as Selim Deringil 
claimed, “the Ottomans constantly felt consulates and embassies were looking 
over their shoulder in matters relating to conversion.”88 The process ihtida 
(embracing Islam) was very lawful; it followed conduct of a strict bureaucracy.89 
For a Christian girl to become a Muslim, she had to appear before the meclis 
(local administrative council) who would inquire her whether she was free, sane 
and adult, plus whether she was tricked, forced or coerced. If the was meclis 
                                                 
86 For a detailed account in the conversion to Islam see, Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and 
Coersion in Islam (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.121-194. 
87 Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, “XIX. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında İngiliz Konsoloslarının Siyasal 
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88 For a detailed information and more accounts see; Selim Deringil,“"There Is No Compulsion in 
Religion": On Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 1839-1856” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 547-575. 
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satisfied with the inquiry, then she proceed to the kadı (judge) in attendance of her 
kin, and only after a successful inspection she might become a Muslim.90 It was 
not unheard of that the community would rush to intervene for the annulations of 
the conversion, this usually ended up with a tension between “the new 
community” of the convert and the former one.91  
 The conversion of Stephana could have been also another cause for a small 
tension between the Muslim and the Christian community of Salonika. 
Nevertheless, perhaps due to cosmopolitan nature of the city, the tension escalated 
into a murder of those who were not responsible for the abduction of Stephana. 
Stephana’s prospective “new community” reacted to her kidnaping and lynched 
the two consuls in a rage of mob behavior. It was the bitterness and anticipation of 
Europe, not the Muslims, turned this crime into a materialization of Muslim 
violence against the Christians of Porte. An out of control inter-communal tension 
was a war of  civilizations for them due to their mass hysteria. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE MURDER OF FRENCH AND GERMAN 
CONSULS AT SALONIKA, 5TH OF MAY 1876 
 
 
 
3.1. Stephana Kidnapped from Her Village, 3rd of May 1876 
 
 Stephana, as it was her Christian name, was a Bulgarian girl from a small 
village called Avrethisar, a town also known as Bogdantza.1 She had lost her 
father while she was twelve or thirteen years old, and lived with her mother and 
two brothers in this Ottoman Macedonian town in poverty.2 After the death of his 
father, Dellio, she became more and more acquainted with the Muslim women of 
the town; some claimed that she carried her acquaintance to intimacy with the 
Muslim men as well.3 According to her statement, soon after the death of his 
                                                 
1 Bogdantza, is today Bogdantsi situated in the Southeastern region of the Republic of Macedonia, 
not far from the Greece border.  
2 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21, 1876, Inclosure 3 in no.106. 
3 Pericles H. Lazzaro, United States Consular Agent at Salonika claimed that “Her [Stephana’s] 
light reputation and the suspicions of the villagers that she had had intimate relations with a young 
Turk of the village lead me to think that she was in connivance with her ravishes in order to be 
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father, she embraced Islam, inwardly and by inspiration, she was almost certainly 
influenced by her Muslim neighbors. Stephana’s mother, Maria -or sometimes 
mentioned as Matto- was powerless to coerce her to stop this relation with the 
Muslims, yet persistently opposed her decision. Soon after, in May 1876, just 
before the feast of St. George for Christians and Hıdırellez for Muslims, on 
Wednesday the 3rd, Stephana was kidnapped by the Muslim women of Bogdantza 
while she was taking water from the town’s fountain.4 While Stephana’s mother 
was out in the wilderness gathering mulberry leaves, these women, brought her to 
one of the other Muslim houses. The wife of the house’s owner who was also the 
mother of Stephana’s probable Muslim lover, refused to have her presence in the 
sanctity of her house until she was made a proper Muslim.5 Thus she was 
compelled to spend two nights in one of her kidnappers’ houses. In order to 
become an official Muslim she required a mazbata -an official paper- that only 
Ottoman Officials in Salonika could provide. She was also given traditional 
Muslim woman clothing; ferâce and yaşmak; a full coat and a veil. On Friday 
morning with the company of Imam (Hodja) of Bogdantza, she departed for the 
                                                                                                                                     
carried of.” also British Consul in Salonika, Blunt labeled her as a “wretched creature.” F.O. 881-
2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21, 1876, Inclosure 3-4, and Lazzaro to Maynard, May 25, in 
Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1– August 
10, 1876), Enclosure 1 in no.71, Microcopy no.46. 
4 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21, 1876 Inclosure 3-4, and Lazzaro to Maynard, May 25, 
Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – 
August 10, 1876), Enclosure 1 in no.71. Microcopy no.46. 
5 A detailed version of the identity of Stephana and her kidnap at 3rd May ; “On connaissait il y a 
six mois dans le village de Bogdanitza que Stefanini, fille du défunt Dellio Kiota, et de Marie, [...] 
avait des relations avec le fils du garde champêtre Omer Zintsoglou, Mustapha. Plusieurs voisins 
de cette malhonnête femme lui avaient fait observer la conduite de sa fille: quelques Musulmans 
aussi en firent autant. La jeunne fille ayant pris depuis quelques jours ses vêtements et quelques-
unes de sa mère les envoya chez son amant. Le mercredi vers 10 heures de l’après-midi sous 
prétexte qu’elle irait à la fontaine elle se fit enlever par quelques Ottomans, qui la transportèrent a 
la maison d’Omer Zintsoglou, père de Mustafa. Mais a cette heure ni l’un ni l’autre ne se 
trouvaient la, c’est pourquoi l’épouse du premier n’accepta pas la fille et lui dit: “Qu’elle se fasse 
Musulmane d’abord et de venir après chez moi.” On conduisit alors la fille a la maison d’Ahmet 
Soubashi, Muktar, frère d’Omer Agha, et le Vendredi, afin qu’elle ne fût pas reconnu, on la fit 
prendre de Karasouli le chemin de fer, ou elle fut rencontré par sa mère. Elle était accompagnée 
par le Hodja du village, d’une negresse et de de Mehmet Agha de Ghevreli.”  F.O. 881-2984, 
Blunt to Derby, June 21, 1876, Inclosure 4 in no.106. “Exposé de Hussein, Fils d’Ismail, Habitant 
du dit Village.” 
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southern town of Gevheli (Gevhelija of today) to take a train to Salonika. She was 
also given enough money for a train ticket by the Hodja. After two hours of walk 
she made it to the Gevheli train station.6  
 Meanwhile, Maria was made aware of her daughter’s fate upon her return to 
the town. Consequently, she went to Muhtar7 (village headman) who was also a 
Christian, to inquire on what to do and hoping to learn her daughter’s 
whereabouts. Probably unaware of the fact that her daughter was on her way to 
Salonika to become officially a Muslim, Maria asked for the assistance to save her 
daughter from the hands of the Muslim women. The Muhtar, stating that he 
cannot dare to go near the Muslim women, advised her to bring a complaint to the 
konak; the seat of government for the Vilayet (district) of Salonika,8 ironically the 
same place where Stephana was headed as well.  
It is not clear whether Stephana and her incognita company, managed to 
find a train at Gevheli for Salonika. She either took a train there or walked for six 
hours to Karasuli (today’s Greek town of Polykastro) though she claimed the 
latter. However, walking seventeen kilometers on mountainous terrain on foot was 
indeed implausible. Whatever be the case, she was in the company of an Arab 
woman, by the name of Ruşen on the way from Karasuli to Salonika. Stephana 
during the journey expressed Ruşen of her intentions to become a Muslim, and 
                                                 
6 Gevheli, or Gevhelija is also in the Republic of Macedonia, being a border town with Greece. In 
her examination, Stephana stated that she was alone all the way from Bogdantza to Salonika; that 
is to say, without the company of the town’s Imam. However, testimonies of the townspersons 
unanimously pointed out that she was in the company of the Imam. It was confirmed that Imam 
was not present to conduct the Friday’s Prayer and was probably with Stephana during the time of 
the prayer. 
7 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876,  Inclosure 4 in no.106. “Evidence taken at the 
Village of Bogdantza - Apres avoir preté serment l’exposé de Delhio, fils de Stenhil, Mouchtar du 
village.” 
8 The City of Salonika and the Province of Salonika are not to be confused. One is the actual port 
city, and the latter is a governing unit in the Ottoman Macedonia, covering also Avrethisar and the 
other mentioned towns. City of Salonika is the capital of the Vilayet of Salonika, much like the 
state system in the United States. 
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also told her that she was in the company of a Hodja, whose presence was 
confirmed by Ruşen when she saw him on Karasulu (or Karasuli) station.9 Yet, 
whether he got on board from there or from somewhere else is unclear.  Naturally, 
the imam of Bogdanitza even if he was present in the same train was not in the 
same compartment where Stephana and Ruşen were travelling, for the reason that 
it was required by the law of country; which forbade the presence of men in the 
car with women, obliged the Imam to go into another compartment. In Karasuli, 
another person also spotted Stephana and hodja, it was Maria, who by her own 
means, made it to the same train, and while the train stopped at Karasuli, she 
noticed her daughter. Fortunate Maria, upon uniting with her daughter, tried to 
convince Stephana anew, to make abandon her quest to become a Muslim; she 
was aware that it was a voluntary decision since she also admitted that throughout 
the history of Bogdanitza she never met with a single case of forced conversion to 
Islam.10 Despite the account in which Stephana claimed that she met Ruşen in the 
train, Maria dismissed her as a companion given to Stephana by the Muslims and 
spoke to her daughter in Bulgarian. The fact that they all remained on board, 
despite the constant stops of the train on its way to Salonika, can point the failure 
of Maria to persuade her daughter.11 The train arrived in Salonika around early 
Friday (the 5th) evening.  
 
                                                 
9 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21, 1876, Inclosure 3 in no.106. “Examination of Rushen, 
Arab, daughter of Abdullah, before the Imperial Commission of Inquiry, Salonica, May 17, 1292.” 
10 Ottoman Official Conducting the Investigation by the name of Vahan Efendi asks Maria; 
“Before this affair, did any children (Christians) become Mohommedan [sic] by force?” and Maria 
answers simply as “No, never.” She also added that Christians and Muslims in her town get along 
very well. F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21, 1876, Inclosure 3 in no.106. “Examination of 
Matto (Maria), the Girl’s Mother.” 
11 Consular Blunt wrote to Early of Derby on May 30 the following; “She also repeatedly declared 
that no one forced her to embrace Mahomedanism; that during the time she was concealed by the 
Greeks, efforts were made to dissuade her from renouncing the Christian religion; and that she was 
determined to follow the Mahomedan faith.” F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 30, Inclosure in 
no.72. 
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3.2. Stephana Arrives in Salonika, at 5th of May, and Kidnapped Again 
 
 The Salonika terminal was crowded with Muslims, Christian Ottoman 
subjects and foreigners coming for St. George’s festal and Hıdırellez. Stephana as 
a stranger to the city approached the policemen12 (zaptiyes) in the station, to be 
accompanied to the Governor’s Mansion - the konak. Thus, a corporal with two 
men took charge of her to escort her to the konak.13 According to the newspapers, 
Maria cried after her daughter as “is there any Christian here who will save my 
daughter from becoming a Turk?”14 and begged nearby Christian kinsmen to help 
her save Stephana from the hands of the Muslims. She thus addressed herself to 
the employees of the Railway Company -all of them were Christians- explaining 
to them with deep sorrow the carrying off her daughter and begging them to help 
in her recover. Although at that moment few in number, Maria found assistance 
among the Greeks15 at the station. Flamed by religious zeal and headed by George 
Abbott, brother of Alfred Abbott and Henry Abbott, Consul of Germany, this mob 
made an attempt to seize Stephana by force from the hands of the policemen. 
They tore her ferâce and yaşmak; an action perceived by the Muslims as an 
assault to a Muslim woman thus signified a grave insult. After a short struggle 
policemen managed to drag the girl from the hands of the zealous Christians. 
Nevertheless, the three policemen were quickly overpowered by the mob which 
                                                 
12 Ottoman police was a military unit not a civil force, it was considered as a municipal force to 
keep the order and they were under the command of the Governor-General of the vilayet. Glen W. 
Swanson, “The Ottoman Police” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 7, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 
1972), pp. 243-260, p.251. 
13 F.O. 881-2984, Inclosure 2 in no.106. Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, “Preliminary Deposition of 
Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police”. 
14 The Times, Jun 03, 1876; pg. 6; Issue 28646; col D, “Salonica After the Assassinations.” A 
correspondant write. 
15 In all accounts the mob that seized Stephana at the station were mentioned as “Greeks”. It is not 
clear whether they are composed of solely Greeks or Christians in general. 
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was ever growing in size, which were around one hundred and fifty people.16 
Consequently, in a short scuffle this crowd of Christians, who in their turn, 
emerged with Stephana in their possession, and hastily carried her to a nearby 
carriage.17 The idle carriage was waiting for Pericles Hadji Lazzaro, the Consular 
Agent for the United States, who was expected to come from an excursion at a 
nearby town by the name of Vodina with the same train in which Stephana arrived 
in Salonika. The Christian mob forced Stephana and Maria into this carriage, and 
quickly told the coachman a short version of their story. He did as he was told and 
galloped the horses to the United States’ Consular residence, the policemen tried 
to catch up with the carriage by running behind it but to no avail. A Muslim 
crowd, while keeping their distance, observed this entire event.18 
 The carriage with its passengers on board; composed of Stephana, Maria 
and servants of Lazzaro, dashed to the United States’ Consular residence. The 
residence was a mansion in the Frank Quarter of the city, side by side with the 
church of St. Charalambous. Lazzaro’s Mother and his Brother Nicholas Lazzaro 
were enjoying a walk in the decorated city for the festal. Maria begged the 
servants of Lazzaro family to have them for a night, who were not so keen to 
throw them out, after hearing what just happened to them. Mother of Lazzaro was 
first to return, upon seeing her, the coachman approached and said; “Madame I 
have done something but I do not know if well or not. I have brought to the 
Consulate a young Bulgarian girl that some Christians at the station rescued from 
                                                 
16 The Governor General of Salonika, Vali Mehmed Refet Pasha’s account also published in the 
official newspaper of the district, “Selânik” of May 8 tells the exact same story of this kidnap in 
the train station. 
17 BOA, İ.DUİT, Dosya No:138, Gömlek No:33. 
18 F.O. 78-2495 Blunt to Elliot no.22 and BOA, İ.DUİT, Dosya no:138 Gömlek no:33. The 
beginning of the event that is the seizure of the girl by the Christians is narrated as the same in all 
accounts.   
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the hands of the Turks and forcing me to stop put into my master’s carriage”.19 
Miss Lazzaro, decided to wait for her son Nicholas, before giving the final verdict 
about what to be done about Maria and Stephana. While waiting, Maria and 
possibly Stephana too, begged Miss Lazzaro for a permission to remain in their 
house,20 Maria told that her daughter was forcibly kidnapped from her village and 
sent to Salonika and by the efforts of the fellow Christians, was saved from the 
hands of her kidnappers.21Nicholas arrived later; however, he was distracted and 
hesitant, yielded to the prayers of the refugees in the house. So, it was decided that 
Maria and Stephana can remain in the house for the night, on the condition to take 
their leave at first thing in the morning.22  
 
 
3.3. A Crisis Looming in Salonika 
 
 The next day, Saturday the 6th of May, an Orthodox priest was brought to the 
Consulate residence to confront Stephana. He was unable to make her repent for 
her decision hence, towards the midday after having a lunch; the two women left 
the mansion not through the door of the Consulate but through a little back door, 
                                                 
19 Lazzaro to Maynard, May 25 Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), 
Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), Enclosure 1 in no.71. Microcopy no.46. 
20 According to the Times, Stephana begged Mrs. Lazzaro for suit of clothes, declaring that she 
could no longer wear the Turkish robes. It is contradictory of Stephana’s own account that she 
embraced Islam willingly. The Times, May 31, 1876; pg. 5; Issue 28643; col F, “The Salonica 
Assassinations.”  
21 In the account of Lazzaro to Maynard, there is also a certain uncle mentioned, nevertheless, 
since his presence is only mentioned by Lazzaro and only in one place, this uncle’s presence or 
whoever he was, his relation with Maria and Stephana is blurry and questionable. Moreover, the 
statement of Maria, is also the manifestation of the Christian press’ attitude towards the event and 
as well as Lazzaro’s. 
22 Maria and Stephana’s fate after the events at the station on 5th of May is only known through the 
account of P. H. Lazzaro’s letter to Maynard. Lazzaro to Maynard, May 25, Despatches from 
United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), 
Enclosure 1 in no.71. Microcopy no.46. 
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leading to the courtyard of the church of St. Charalambous. They were 
accompanied by a European man and his servant, who came to the Consulate to 
pick them up.23 Their destination was another Greek’s house near to the 
Consulate, that of Mr. Avyerinos24, who was a Greek merchant under Austrian 
protection. People in the house spoke neither Turkish nor Bulgarian. They were 
offered coffee, relaxing and unaware of what was going on in the city. 
 In the morning of the same day, as the news of violation and abduction of a 
Muslim girl by the Christians on yesterday evening spread, Muslims in the city 
were getting restless. Accordingly, a group of representatives from the Muslim 
community of Salonika went to the Governor General’s Mansion, and demanded 
the return of the girl to the faithful, from the Governor Mehmed Refet Pasha. All 
witnesses, Muslim and non-Muslim alike previously reported that the girl was 
carried in United States’ Consular Agent Lazzaro’s coach to his residence. 
Immediately, the Pasha sent two members of the meclis to the Consulate to bring 
the girl to the mansion. These two men, being one Christian and a Muslim, asked 
for Consular Lazzaro, upon learning that he was not at home, inquired for the 
missing Bulgarian girl. Miss Lazzaro, mother of Consular, sent word for his son 
before saying anything to the Pasha’s envoy. Soon after, Nicholas Lazzaro 
returned home and informed them of his decision for the girl to be sent away and 
now had no information of the girl’s wherabouts. The meclis’ members returned 
to Mehmed Refet Pasha without Stephana or any adequate information. 
                                                 
23 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, Inclosure 3 in no.106. “Examination of the 
Bulgarian Girl ‘Stephana’ who adopted Turkish name ‘Aiysheh’”. In her account, Stephana claims 
that after a lunch at Lazzaro’s, a woman servant and a tall Frank with a hat and a beard took them 
to another house. 
24 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 14 (received June 22), Blunt to Elliot, June 6., no.97 
Inclosure in no.97. 
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 The delay in the girl’s delivery surmounted the stress on the gathering mob in 
front of the konak. Some natives of the city acted as Tellals (town criers) and they 
called the faithful in streets of Salonika to close their shops, and to gather at the 
Saatli Camii, near the konak. They were joined by business owners in the city who 
agitated the Muslims for the sake of the religion and gather for the purpose of 
recovery of a stolen Muslim girl.25 Rumors ran rampant, vivid descriptions of how 
the Greeks torn her clothing and the wailings of the little girl moved the religious 
spirit of the Muslim community. Known zealots of Islam, Albanians in particular, 
were arming themselves for a reckless endeavor of rescue of the Bulgarian girl. In 
obedience to the call, some shops were closed as their owners set out for the 
konak, while others left because of the fear of the gathering storm.26 
The assemblage in front of the Governor General Mehmed Pasha’s 
Mansion was gaining a more intimidating character with every passing moment.27 
The Pasha opened his window and summoned the crowd to disperse immediately, 
while the Chief of Police, Colonel Salim Bey tried to soothe them by the promises 
that the Bulgarian girl would be delivered in a few hours.28 Their aggressive 
                                                 
25 “Hussein Effendi, du district Tchebekli, acheteur de dîmes et fabricateur de peau, est accusé 
d'avoir invité le peuple a se regrouper, sans armes, et d'avoir instigué la foule dans la Mosquée de 
Hamza Bey d'aller réclamer la fille ou de périr pour l'amour de la religion; d'avoir été un des 
premiers a s'introduire auprès du Gouverneur-Général et d'avoir été remarqué a la Mosquée de 
Saatli. Il a été a trois ans d'emprisonnement a partir de la date du 5 Djemajulevvel, 1293.” and 
“Courd Ali, anier, accusé d’avoir crié dans les rues invitant en engagement le people a fermer les 
boutiques et a se réunir a la Mosquée de Saatli et d’avoir été un des premiers a s’introduire auprès 
de Gouverneur-Général et d’avoir été remarqué a la dite mosquée. Condamné a cinq ans aux 
travaux forces a partir de la date du 5 Djemajulevvel, 1293.” F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot June 
18, Inclosure 2 in no.76. 
26 Thrace and Neogolos of May 11, published that the Muslims upon hearing the calls of tellal 
armed themselves and rushed to the Governor General’s Mansion. The presence of a green flag to 
rally the faithfull is confirmed by Consular Blunt’s account. 1876. Mayard to Secretary of the 
State, May 20, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 
(January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67, Microcopy no.46. 
27 Albay Salim Bey, claims that the crowd was not armed and were around only one hundred men. 
Possibly, that is why at that moment the officials did not considered them as a serious threat. F.O. 
881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition of 
Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police”. 
28 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition of 
Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police”. 
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slogans were easily heard by Mehmed Refet Pasha. Moreover, the appearance of 
the Pasha’s empty handed envoy further galvanized the crowd. They demanded 
satisfaction because news about the spirited away Bulgarian girl were by no 
means convincing for them. They strongly believed that the girl was not lost at all, 
but was in the possession of the American Consul Lazzaro. The crowd then 
moved to Saatli Camii, a mosque just in the opposite street of the Governor’s 
Mansion.29 They planted the green flag in the courtyard. The appearance of the 
green flag of Islam in the courtyard of the Mosque, a flag which was covered by 
the Holy Scriptures and symbolized the war against the infidel, gave the mob an 
overzealous spirit. Encouraged by the timidity and the indecisiveness of the 
Pasha, they threatened to march to the Frank Quarter of the city, then assault on 
the United States’ Consulate, hence rescue the Bulgarian girl.30 It was said; they 
were arming and making preparations for this assault.31 Mehmed Refet Pasha 
gave an order to two sergeants to take some policemen and to proceed to the 
Frank Quarter with the intention to prevent a possible march of the crowd there.32 
The Pasha desired to make a personal appearance before the crowd in the mosque, 
but heeded the warnings of the members of the meclis not do so. He then decided 
to send Salim Bey and some members of the meclis with all of the reserves in the 
Mansion, who were only about twenty men. The envoy found the green flag 
flying in the middle of the courtyard. Members of the meclis tried to exhort the 
Muslims to disperse, but the crowd turned deaf ear to all of their threats and 
promises. Salim Bey hurried back to the konak in order to inform Mehmed Refet 
Pasha that this was not a mere restless mob and assured him of their extremely 
                                                 
29 For the scene of the murders and the assamblage please refer to Appendix B, at the back. 
30 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby June 21 (received July 2) Inclosure 1 in no.106. 
31 F.O. 78-2495 Blunt to Elliot, 9 May, 1876, no 22. 
32 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21, 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition 
of Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police”. 
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offensive intentions. The Pasha, in his testimony claimed that, he immediately 
sent for armed assistance; he wrote orders to Albay (Colonel) Atta Bey of the 
Salonika fortress for topçus (artillerymen) and to Izzet Bey Commander of the 
Ottoman ironclad Iclaliye33, harbored in Salonika quay for his marines.34 
 
  
3.4. French and German Consuls Murdered by a Muslim Mob 
 
 About this time, French Consul Jules Moulin and German Consul Henry 
Abbott -brother of George Abbott who took the girl from the hands of the 
policemen on Friday the 5th- came to the vicinity of the konak. Consul Moulin was 
thirty three years old, and was a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor. He had been 
an Assistant Consul at Alexandria. Henry Abbott was an Orthodox Christian of 
English nationality. Both of them were married to the sisters of Pericles H. 
Lazzaro, thus the kidnap of the girl and the involvement of Lazzaro’s name was a 
family matter besides their duty as Consuls.35 Even though, for what purpose they 
approached to the heart of the trouble is unknown, it was speculated that they 
were tempted by some Greeks to address a representation to the Governor General 
about the girl’s conversion, while the other possibility to explain their presence 
was that they only went to see whether the Muslims were really irritated and to 
                                                 
33 “Iclaliye” was a frigate in the Ottoman Navy, originally ordered by Egypt from SA Stabilimento 
Tecnico Triestino, San Rocco in 1868, and was launched the next year. She had a crew of 16 
officers and 132 sailors. She served until 1928.  Bernd Langensiepen Ahmet Güleryüz, 1828-1923 
Osmanlı Donanması, (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi) p.92. 
34 The name of the Ottoman ironclad was incorrectly given in the accounts of Consul Blunt as 
“Edirne” to the correct name should be “Iclaliye”. BOA, HR.TO.., Dosya No: 516, Gömlek No:52. 
F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition of 
Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police” and F.O. 78-2495, Blunt to Elliot, 
no.22. 
35 The Times, May 10, 1876; pg. 7; Issue 29625; col B, “The Salonica Assassinations”.  
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observe if they posed a real threat to the Frank Quarter.36 Be that as it may, the 
two consuls were drawn by the crowd into the mosque’s courtyard and surrounded 
by a throng of angry Muslims.37 
 Salim Bey, according to his own account, seeing the state of recent affairs, 
hastily went to the konak and told the Pasha about the seizure of the two consuls 
by the crowd. Mehmed Refet Pasha upon hearing this, jumped up saying “Aman! 
Who brought them?” He acted without delay and crossed the street to go to the 
mosque with the company of Salim Bey and kadi (Muslim judge). They passed 
through the crowd with difficulty to where the consuls were held; a small two 
staged structure adjacent to the mosque which was used as the apartments for 
müderris and class rooms for the students of religion. They got in the room at the 
second floor where some members of the meclis and the consuls were held. 
Meanwhile, Salim Bey was trying to find reinforcements to disperse the crowd. 
His twenty men strong retinue was far from being adequate to protect the small 
building where the consuls were held. Then, Commander Izzet Bey, to the 
contrary of the orders from Mehmed Refet Pasha, appeared with none of his 
marines at his side. He approached Salim Bey and told that his men had already 
landed in the morning, and they were now at Beşçınar; in the public gardens near 
Salonika, for the Hıdırellez feast. Salim Bey ordered him to go to Beşçınar and 
gather his men. Izzet Bey departed straight away. Salim Bey, in the meantime, 
stood by the door leading to the room of the consuls and sent two more of his men 
                                                 
36 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 7, Inclosure in no.42. 
37 From Daily Levant Herald, May 9 1876; “According to one version, Messr. Abbott and Moulin, 
on their way to the Governor-general’s konak, were dragged into the mosque. With the two 
consuls was Mr. Panourias, cancellier of the Greek consulate, and acting in the absence of the 
consul, Mr.Vathikioti. When the crowd attacked the consuls –which they did with iron bars torn 
from the mosque windows- Mr. Panourias made his escape by a window, and ran straight to the 
telegraph office, whence the telegraphed the state of affairs to Mr.Coundourioti, the Greek 
minister in Constantinople.” Maynard to Secretary of the State, May 12, Despatches from United 
States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), Inclosure in 
no.66, Microcopy no.46. 
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to the city’s agora to find more troops. German Consul Henry Abbott, realizing 
the severity of his position, wrote a letter addressed to his brother Alfred Abbott 
about the delivery of the Bulgarian girl from United States’ Consular Residence to 
the mosque without delay. Salim Bey entrusted the letter to one of his men. 
However, the messenger while making his way out of the building was 
intercepted by the crowd; the letter was taken from him and torn into pieces.38  
 With each passing moment, the threat in the courtyard of Saatli Camii 
was increasing. Their advance could still be prevented by the efforts of a few 
policemen. When the French Consul Moulin turned to Salim Bey and asked “Are 
we prisoners here?” the Ottomen officer replied to encourage them “We only 
trying to get the crowd dispersed”.39 At that moment, Colonel Atta Bey of the 
Salonika fortress came to the scene, alas with no troops. The Pasha, devastated, 
inquired him about the topçus; Atta Bey answered that no order had reached him 
and he too departed to gather his men, but he was surrounded on his way out by 
the crowd who would not let him go.40 The members of the meclis made a final 
attempt to convince the mass of the people pushing themselves upstairs to the 
room of the Consuls, to disband. This they did, but their final act was futile 
therefore they returned to the room to barricade themselves in. Consul Abbott, 
meanwhile, wrote another dispatch for his brother. Salim Bey put the letter to the 
coat sleeve of a policeman, and ordered him to go to the house of Alfred Abbot. 
                                                 
38 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition of 
Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police”. 
39 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition of 
Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police”. 
40 According to the Times, while these were happening “[...] the Italian Consul and the chancelier, 
or clerck, of the French Consulate, with urgent entreaties to that officer to proceed, instantly to the 
Mosque. The colonel, very civilly, offered coffee and cigarettes to the Consul and chancelier, and 
instead of starting at once, and showing any readiness to accede to their request, he very 
elaborately endeavored to convince the two foreign officials of the propriety and expediency of 
having the girl restored to the Moslems.” the Times, Jul 19, 1876; pg. 5; Issue 28685; col F, “The 
Salonica Assassinations”.  
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This time, the messenger managed to sally forth. In the note the following was 
written in Greek;  
 
Dear Nicholas 
We are in the midst of trouble and matters are not agreeable. I therefore 
think it would be well to send the girl under guaranty because otherwise 
disagreeable consequences may ensure. 
            Yours Truly, (Signed) Harelos41 
 
During this entire time, not a soul in the Frank Quarter was aware of the 
crisis looming in the mosque. No more than Alfred Abbott, who played his part in 
the kidnap of Stephana, was informed of his brother’s and the French Consul 
Moulin’s condition. He paid a visit to Lazzaro’s residence to learn where the girl 
was taken to, nevertheless, Mother of Lazzaro, told him that she did not know 
where she was. With the arrival of Consular Abbott’s note, so did the news of the 
crisis at Saatli Camii to the Frank Quarter. Alfred Abbott upon receiving the note, 
embarked again for Consular Lazzaro’s mansion. On his way there, he 
encountered British Consul J.E. Blunt near the British Consulate. He showed 
Blunt the letter and gave him a short version of what was going on. Consul Blunt 
and his cavass (bodyguard) Hüseyin Agha, before departing for Saatli Camii to 
assist his colleagues, advised Alfred Abbott not to lose any more time and convey 
the girl to the mosque.42 
 Consul Blunt was a known Turcophile and respected European among the 
Muslims of the city.43 Thus while Blunt and Hüseyin Agha on the way to the 
                                                 
41 Mayard to Secretary of the State, May 20, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67, Lazzaro to Maynard, May 9, 
Enclosure no.10 in 66, Microcopy no.46. The fact that German Consul Henry Abbott addressed 
the letter to Nicholas Lazzaro proves that he was aware of Pericles H. Lazzaro’s absence and his 
brother’s involvement in the kidnap of Stephana. 
42 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 7, Inclosure in no.42. 
43 A story is published about the relations of Consul Blunt with the Muslims in the city; “Last 
Christmas many believed that the Mussulmans of Salonica, were contemplating a massacre of the 
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mosque came across some Muslims who tried to dissuade them to proceed any 
further, since they claimed there was danger for any European and Christian. 
Consul Blunt in return begged them for their help to save his colleagues from the 
mob. He tried to rally some men among the Muslims with references to their 
religion, six of them stepped forward agreeing to assist him. They found the 
crowd getting denser with every step taken, and when they crossed the street 
leading to the konak, they met many armed men, principally Albanians. When 
Consul Blunt got the mosque in his sight, he claimed that a native Turk probably 
who knew him, approached him, put his hand on Blunt’s shoulders and said “The 
only way to save the Consuls, is to have the girl delivered up. Do this and all may 
be saved.” Consul Blunt, as a consequence decided to deviate his course to the 
konak. Surrounded by a body of Muslims protecting him he made it to the relative 
security of the konak. In the guard room, on a piece of paper he wrote the 
following note to the American Consulate, 
 
  Mon cher Pericles, 
Allant a l’assistance de Moulin et Abbott, renfermés par populace dans 
une mosquée avec le Vali, j’ai vu que l’affaire est très dangereuse et 
Mahomédans très excités. Quelques-uns m’ont forces rebrousser chemin 
pour appaiser [sic] populace, faut absolument envoyer la fille au Conak, 
ou je suis, et resterai pour assister mes collègues.44 
(Signed) Blunt, Consul.45 
   
                                                                                                                                     
Christians, and the Consuls with the exception of Mr. Blunt, who refused to attend, held a meeting 
to investigate the matter. Little or no evidence was produced at this meeting, but the alarm 
continued, and reached a panic on the night on which it was said the massacre would be effected. 
Mr. Blunt, however, maintained his confidence. The gates of the British Consulate were thrown 
open; the Consul himself, after visiting the British residents and assuring them that there was 
nothing to be feared, spent the night wandering in the streets of the Turkish quarter, or calling on 
the principal Turks and making them swear with most solemn oath that they had no hostile 
intentions against the Christians. The night passed, nothing occurred, and Mr. Blunt enjoyed for 
the time his triumph.” The Times, Wednesday, Jun 21, 1876; pg. 6; Issue 28661; col E, “The 
Salonica Inquiry, Our Correspondent”. 
44 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 14 (received June 22) no.97, Blunt to Elliot, June 6, 
Inclosure in no.97. 
45 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 14 (received June 22) no.97, Blunt to Elliot, June 6, 
Inclosure in no.97. 
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       He confided the note to Hüseyin Agha, and assigned him to find the girl, and 
if necessary bring her by force to the mosque. In the meantime, Alfred Abbott, 
back at the Frank Quarter, desperately explained the crisis to Mother Lazzaro and 
the dire consequences which may arise if the girl would not be delivered. Miss 
Lazzaro told him that according to the rumors circulating in the Frank Quarter, the 
girl was at merchant Avyerinos’ house. Indeed, Alfred found Stephana there, and 
with her he went on his way for an attempt to save his brother.46 Himself, 
Avyerinos and Stephana stumbled upon to the cavass Hüseyin Agha on the road 
to the konak. Possibly fearing from the retribution of the Muslim masses, they 
entrusted Stephana to the cavass. Thus, Hüseyin Agha -who was a Muslim Turk- 
and Stephana with the armed escort of only two policemen set off for the 
mosque.47 
 The consuls were plainly under siege in the small building at the mosque. 
The crowd was trying to penetrate through the last defense of the consuls, 
consisted of a few policemen. According to Salim Bey, Mehmed Refet Pasha got 
pale when he realized the rigorousness of the mob, and their conviction to get to 
the two consuls. Three quarters of an hour had passed since the letter from Henry 
Abbott departed for his brother, yet there was still no news about the Bulgarian 
girl. Then, a window was broken, with its sound the crowd cried and vociferated. 
They began pulling of the iron bars of the broken windows.48  Few remaining 
                                                 
46 Lazzaro to Maynard, May 25, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), 
Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), Enclosure 1 in no.71, Microcopy no.46. 
47 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 14 (received June 22) no.97, Blunt to Elliot, June 6, and 
Lazzaro to Maynard, May 25, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), 
Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), Enclosure 1 in no.71, Microcopy no.46. 
48 Unanimously all the testimonies relating to the murder of the consuls, asserted that, the Muslim 
mob tore the iron bars from the windows and used them as weapons. It also confirms that the mob 
was not heavily armed or not armed at all before the gathering begun, contrary to what is said by 
Consul Lazzaro (Lazzaro to Maynard, May 25, Despatches from United States Ministers to 
Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), Enclosure 1 in no.71, in 
Microcopy no.46) and most of the Western origin newspapers. F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, 
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members of meclis left the scene upon this sight. Soon after the bars of the 
windows removed, the mob poured in the divanhane (gallery) of the building. 
Someone from the crowd was crying “we want the girl” and the rest were pushing 
themselves ever upwards.49 In a short scuffle, they managed to overwhelm the 
remaining policemen, and swarmed in the room where the consuls, the Pasha, 
Salim Bey and two policemen were waiting. The consuls were behind the 
Ottoman officers, yet the crowd begun to hit Consul Moulin and Abbott over the 
head and shoulders of them. Apparently, the Pasha embraced one consul in order 
to protect him and the other officers did the same for the other consul. The pasha 
cried not to strike in vain. Probably as they claimed such; the officers received 
their share of lynch and fell down in pain.50 Nevertheless, the real targets of the 
mob were the two consuls. With the iron bars, sticks and knifes they bludgeoned 
the two consuls. The officers, still struggling, cried for water to give to the two 
consuls, alas they were already dead. The mob continued to hit their lifeless 
bodies of them for a while.51 
 Back at the Frank Quarter, Hüseyin Agha with Stephana was making their 
way to the mosque with all haste. At the exit of the quarter they ran into some 
armed mob going to the Frank Quarter - to the American Consulate as it was 
                                                                                                                                     
June 21 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition of Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or 
ex-Chief of Salonica Police” and “Deposition of Ahmed Effendi, Mulazim (Lieutenant) of Police” 
and “Deposition of Ali Agha, Yuz-Bashi of Salonica Police”. 
49 Berber Memik, “[Il] est accusé d'avoir été vu pendant l'émeute, poussant la foule sur les 
escaliers et s'efforçant de monter et d'avoir enfin crié "nous voulons la fille". Il a été condamné à 3 
ans aux travaux forcés a partir de la date du 3 Djemajulevvel, 1293.” F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to 
Elliot, June 18, Inclosure 2 in no.76. 
50 It was brought to the attention by the Times that “It has been indisputably proved that while the 
Consuls received 30 knife wounds each, neither the Vali nor any other person present in the room 
was hurt by a single scratch”. This observation, if it was true, naturally made the account of 
Mehmed Refet Pasha and Salim Bey erroneous. the Times, Jul 19, 1876; pg. 5; Issue 28685; col F, 
“The Salonica Assassinations.”  
51 This last scene is narrated by three Ottoman officers, in their testimony that can be found in  
F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, Inclosure 2 in no.106. “Preliminary Deposition of 
Colonel Salim Bey, Alai Bey, or ex-Chief of Salonica Police” and “Deposition of Ahmed Effendi, 
Mulazim (Lieutenant) of Police” and “Deposition of Ali Agha, Yuz-Bashi of Salonica Police”. and 
the official version of the murder by Mehmed Refet Pasha. 
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presumed. The mob, howling and shouting made their advance to the Quarter. 
Hüseyin Agha cried out that the girl was surrendered; nevertheless, the 
unconvinced mob pointed their guns at them, a shot was fired but it missed. It was 
the policemen in the company of Hüseyin Agha and Stephana who confirmed the 
identity of the girl thus halting the mob. After a short feu de joie the mob turned 
back, now cheering and satisfied, they no longer posed a threat the Frank 
Quarter.52 Minutes later they made it to the mosque, upon the sight of the 
delivered girl, the mob dispersed calmly and quickly. 
 The fires were also heard by Mehmed Refet Pasha who returned to the 
konak just before the deliverance of Stephana. He and Consul Blunt interpreted 
the gun shots as either “the police were firing on the mob or a general massacre 
has commenced”.53 The Pasha, therefore, concerned about the safety of Consul 
Blunt tried to hide him in his harem. Mehmed Refet Pasha informed the consul on 
the fate of his colleagues. Consul Blunt, terrified, proceeded into the personal 
quarters of the Pasha. The chaos was also reigning inside the house as members of 
Mehmed Refet Pasha’s family ran about screaming and shrieking. After a while, 
Consul Blunt, summoning the courage, managed to write a telegram addressed to 
the nearest British consulate in Athens.54 Fearing of a possibility that telegraph 
wires were cut, Consul Blunt entrusted a short penned letter to one of the officers 
in konak and held him responsible for the safe transmission of this dispatch to 
British Consulate at Constantinople. The incident at Salonika was thus heard from 
this following message of the British Consul;  
                                                 
52 After the affair, Consul Blunt recommended his cavass Hüseyin Agha, for favorable 
consideration to the Earl of Derby, and to explain his exemplary actions he gave a detailed version 
of what happened while Stephana was in Hüseyin Aghas custody. F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, 
June 14 (received June 22), no.97, Blunt to Elliot, June 6, Inclosure in no.97. 
53 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 14 (received June 22), no.97, Blunt to Elliot, June 6, 
Inclosure in no.97. 
54 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, Received May 7, no.1. 
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6th of May, 6:15 P.M : -“ Very Serious disturbances here by Mahometans 
[sic], owing to abduction by some Greeks a Bulgarian girl who wanted to 
become Mahometan. French and German Consuls were surrounded in a 
mosque and killed, I believe, by Mahometans, who are very irritated and 
all armed. Authorities have not sufficient means to act with exemplary 
severity. I have telegraphed to Her Majesty’s Minister at Athens for 
British vessel-of-war for protection of British subjects.”55 
 
 Hüseyin Agha managed to bring Stephana to the mosque when Consul 
Blunt was still in Mehmed Refet Pasha’s harem. He delivered up Stephana to 
Mehmed Refet Pasha. Upon seeing this, delegates from the mob approached the 
konak to confirm the identity. They demanded that the Pasha would take charge of 
her; this was agreed, accordingly the mob quietly dispersed. 
Nevertheless, even after the murder of the two Consuls, the Ottoman 
Officers were not able to restore the order immediately. The corpses of the 
Consuls, were mutilated, and robbed.56  
 
                                                 
55 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, Received May 7, no.1 
56 BOA, HR.TO.., Dosya No:516 Gömlek No:52. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE SALONIKA INCIDENT 
 
 
 
4.1. Ambassadorial Meeting at Istanbul and the Action of the Porte  
 
It was Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha who was the first to hear what 
had happened in Salonika. Mehmed Refet Pasha’s own version of the incident 
made to Istanbul on Saturday night. According to the newspapers, Nedim Pasha 
was in his country mansion at Bebek. Upon receiving the telegraph, he sent word 
for Reşid Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Sublime Porte. Reşid 
Pasha came to Bebek from his house at Istanbul. With two Pashas there was also 
Munir Bey, who was acting as the introducer of ambassadors at Istanbul.  Three of 
them argued on the mode and the tone of the news that would be conveyed to the 
foreign ambassadors. As a result, Munir Bey left Bebek for Pera1, carrying the 
Grand Vizier’s message. Nevertheless, it was already two o’clock in the morning; 
                                                 
1 Pera; is today’s Beyoğlu district of Istanbul. During the 19th century, it was the place where 
almost all European Embassies were situated. During the period, it had a large population of 
inhabitants of foreign origin (principally Europeans) and Ottoman Christians.  
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before he arrived in town, he could obtain admittance neither at the German nor 
the English Embassy where everyone was in bed, but at the latter embassy he left 
a note with the porter, which was handed in the morning.2 
The corps diplomatique indeed received the note of Mahmud Nedim Pasha 
on Sunday morning. Furthermore, intelligence about the Salonika incident was 
also pouring to their desks from their own sources. It was decided that the 
ambassadors should convey at the Russian Embassy, the doyen of diplomacy; at 
General Ignatiev’s residence. The Sublime Porte was represented in this meeting 
by Reşid Pasha.3 Also, the Sultan’s own representative was present in the meeting 
and expressed the profound regret of Sultan Abdülaziz about this deplorable 
event. The demands made in this conference by the foreign ambassadors were 
published in the newspapers at 8th of May;4 
 
1. That the murderers of the Consuls of France and Germany at Salonica 
[sic], and the instigators of the outbreak which took place in that town, 
shall be punished in an exemplary manner; 
2. That all the provincial valis (governors-generals) shall be instructed to 
exercise redoubled vigilance in order to maintain public tranquility 
and that they shall be held directly responsible for any disturbances 
arising in the provinces under their administration; 
3. That the funeral of the two Consul shall take place publicly at 
Salonica, with every attendant pomp and ceremony; 
4. That all the provincial valis (governors-generals) shall receive 
notification of the punishment inflicted upon the guilty in this manner; 
5. That the Turkish newspapers generally shall be requested not to 
publish articles tending to excite the public mind and arouse the 
fanaticism of the Mussulman population. 
 
                                                 
2 Maynard to Sec. of State, May 20 1876, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67, Microcopy no.46. “From Daily 
Levant Herald First Intelligence received in Istanbul.” 
3 Maynard to Secretary of the State, May 20, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67, Microcopy no.46. 
4 Maynard to Secretary of State, May 12, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), Enclosure no.4 in no.66, Microcopy 
no.46. 
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Neither the meeting of the ambassadors nor the promises of the Sublime 
Porte appeased the Great Powers. Notes from all around the major capitals of the 
West were flowing to Istanbul. Their tone and their arguments were demanding 
and harsh.5 Ottoman Ambassadors were charged by the European Governments to 
inform the Porte about the possible dire consequences if they were to remain 
unsatisfied with the progress.6 Moreover, while the negotiations were still 
continuing, the Porte was receiving reports about the ships of war belonging to 
France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Greece to Salonika in order to impose a 
gunboat diplomacy.7 The situation was beginning to look like the aftermath of 
Jeddah Massacres eighteen years ago. 
The Sublime Porte was justified in having been troubled about a 
recurrence of the circumstances of Jeddah Crisis of 1858.8 As at that year; two 
consuls and various individuals under the protection of the European powers were 
killed by a Muslim mob in an act of lynch. Soon after the murder of the two 
consuls, British ships had blockaded and bombarded the town, after that they 
executed ten Muslims who were guilty according to their inquiries. It was a direct 
intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire and a major blow to its 
sovereignty and its prestige. It was a déjà vu for the Porte; the armada of the 
European powers was sailing to the location where the crime was committed and 
the capitals of European powers were blaming the Porte for incompetence with 
                                                 
5 See; BOA, HR.TO.., Dosya No: 122 Gömlek No: 58. BOA, HR.TO.., Dosya No:124 Gömlek 
No:93. BOA, HR.TO.., Dosya No:124 Gömlek No:100.  
6 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya No: 124 Gömlek No: 84.  
7 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya No: 124 Gömlek No: 84. and BOA, HR.SYS., Dosya no: 13, Gömlek 
No:55. 
8 Jeddah Massacre; on 15 June 1858, twenty-two people were murdered in Jeddah. “They include 
the British vice-consul and the French consul and his wife. Of the twenty-two, seven were French 
subjects or under French protection, six British, seven Ottomans, one Russian, and one Greek were 
killed.” W.L. Ochsenwald, “The Jidda Massacre of 1858,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 13, no. 3 
(Oct., 1977), pp. 314-326. 
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protection of the lives of its Christians and for the execution of the required 
justice.9    
The murder at Salonika was not perceived as an isolated event as it was 
perceived about Jeddah. According to the European and Ottoman Christian public 
opinion, the Salonika Incident was the first of many prospective massacres that 
could happen in any part of the Empire. The Porte could not afford protests of 
procrastination indictments as usually blamed by the Europeans. Faced with 
similar crises, the Porte was blamed for deliberately stalling the European 
counterparts because of its slow decision making process or the delay in decisive 
action. Thus, the Porte this time in order to prevent possible dissatisfaction, acted 
swiftly and decisively. In the following day after the meeting at the Russian 
Embassy, Eşref Pasha10 -the former governor of İşkodra- with some troops, and 
Vahan Efendi, the commissioner from the Ministry of Justice were sent to 
Salonika on a dispatch ship “Izzeddin” along with the French and German 
delegates on board. The Porte obviously was not gambling with the European 
Powers about the incident at Salonika, since it agreed to have delegates as 
observers from the European powers during the trials. Additionally, the vali of 
Salonika was removed, with Eşref Pasha resuming the title; and the investigation 
was to be carried out by an Armenian Christian officer; Vahan Efendi, the Under-
Secretary of the State from the Ministry of Justice (memûr-i mülkiye).11 Vahan 
Efendi was, in all probability, chosen for his identity to appease possible 
                                                 
9 W.L. Ochsenwald claims that the failure of the Sublime Porte to culprits to justice was due to the 
slow communication because of the distance between Hijaz and Istanbul. However, Salonika was 
not Jeddah; it was a port city near Istanbul connected to capital with telegraph wires. 
10 Eşref Pasha; graduated from the Military academy with recommendation, he was also a poet and 
musician. Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, C.XV, p.79. Horace Mayard, claimed that Eşref Pasha was also the 
former minister to Teheran. According to the Daily Levant Herald, 9 May 1876, the ship was 
“Fevaîd”. Mayard to Secretary of State. Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.66, Microcopy no.46. 
11 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya No: 516 Gömlek No: 52. 
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dissatisfactions about the prejudice of a Muslim investigator, in a case in which 
the religion played a crucial role, and this choice of the Porte did not escape from 
the notice of the Powers.12 
 
 
4.2. Panic among the Christians of the Ottoman Empire 
 
Despite the efforts of the Sublime Porte, the news of the slain consuls by a 
Muslim mob was not perceived with steadfastness by the foreigners and the 
Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Fear of a possible massacre directed to the 
Christians of the Empire by Muslims was a shared apprehension by the Christian 
public opinion. Sir Henry G. Elliot, the British ambassador to the Porte, was one 
of those who were afraid of repetition of what happened at Salonika. He wrote to 
London in the same day of the meeting at the Russian Embassy; 
The irritation of the Turkish population has become so great that little is 
required to put all Christians to jeopardy. The Porte shows readiness to do all 
that is required to avoid anything that may add to the excitement. If decisive 
result to come to at Berlin with regard to Herzegovina, great care should be 
taken to ask for nothing that the Turkish Government cannot accept and 
engage to carry out. Europe might enforce its decisions, but could not do so 
without the frightful massacres of Christians.13  
  
 In the West, already appalling public opinion on the Ottoman Empire was 
further wounded by the press. In general, the press for the non-Muslim readers of 
the Ottoman Empire, and the Foreign Press were fanning the flame of panic with 
their news about the nature of the Salonika incident. The Muslims in the Ottoman 
                                                 
12 Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – 
August 10, 1876), Microcopy no.46. 
13 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby May 7, no.6. 
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Empire were anathematized by these publications. In the Greek newspapers of the 
Ottoman Empire, the incident was idealized and romanticized. The mentioned 
press was clearly biased with the Christians’ claims about the incident, and with 
their descriptions they were trying to justify the actions of the Greeks who 
kidnapped Stephana at the station. According to their correspondents, the Greeks 
were the downtrodden ones by the Muslims. The Muslims at Salonika -and all 
around in that matter- were portrayed as bloodthirsty religious fanatics. The 
apostasy of Stephana found no place in their narrative. Horace Mayard, the United 
States Ambassador reported that in a Greek daily newspaper in Constantinople,  
Neogolos of May 19, on the nature of the incident, the following was published; 
A very pretty Christian girl was carried off on 21st of April for 
dishonorable purposes by the mussulmans[sic], while she was taking water 
at Bogdanitza. [...] When out of the car mother and daughter began crying 
and screaming and imploring from the crowd which happened to be there 
for assistance to have the girl delivered from her captors. [...] A certain 
Emin Effendi whose harem the girl was destined, seeing that she was 
delivered by Christians excited the mussulmans to resistance. [...]14 
 
Thrace a newspaper published in Istanbul, while mentioning the kidnap of 
Stephana at Salonika train station wrote;  
The Christians moved by their lamentable cries especially the mother’s 
and getting naturally excited by religious sentiment rushed to the platform 
and snatched both mother and daughter out of the hands of the authorities 
using as a matter of course some force. Emin Effendi seeing himself 
foiled/failed by the loss of the object of his passions, from that evening 
excited those classes which could arouse. [The Muslim mob] whose 
appearance was very horrible and whose cries resembled the roaring of 
animals [...]15 
 
                                                 
14 Mayard to Sec. of State, the Neologos? of May 19, a daily Greek paper of Constantinople., May 
20 1876, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 
1 – August 10, 1876), no.67. Microcopy no.46. 
15 Mayard to Sec. of State, The Thrace another Greek journal in Constantinople, May 20 1876, 
Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – 
August 10, 1876), no.67, Microcopy no.46. 
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Another newspaper wrote about the two murdered consuls; 
[...] The state of the bodies of the victims, barely identifiable, hacked and 
mangled with wounds that must have inflicted long after life was extinct; 
indicate a savage bloodthirstiness which only religious fanaticism can 
kindle. [...]16 
 
The newspapers published in the West were also not immune to label the 
Muslims as barbarous fanatics. The New York Times of May 11 claimed that the 
outrage was premeditated; 
The assassination is not an isolated occurrence. The mussulmans were 
previously much agitated […] and had assembled several times for the 
purpose of preparing for a massacre of Christians. […] A violent outbreak, 
of which Christians will become the victims, may occur at any moment 
throughout Turkey, and even in Constantinople.17 
 
The Times of June 3, illustrated a horror scene according to the testimony of one 
of its correspondent, without giving a second thought about the impossibility of 
her presence near the murdered consuls when the mob was there; 
[…] so miscreants ruthlessly murdered these two unarmed, defenseless 
beings, who were simply there for the sake of carrying out their duty, and 
each Mohamedan passed round in turn, slashing at the body with his 
weapon as he passed, […] the crowd came up afterwards and dipped their 
hands in blood of the Christians, by which, according to the Koran they 
are supposed to gain some advantage hereafter.18 
 
The warmongering continental press represented by République Française was 
calling all the Powers for a joint intervention to the Ottoman Empire and 
according to Le Monde (the Russian organ in Belgium) the blood of the murdered 
consuls were crying for vengeance –evidently their notion of vengeance was not 
about courtroom and justice, but about smoking guns of ironclads. Journal des 
Débats prophesied that today they had an assassination; tomorrow it was bound to 
                                                 
16 Mayard to Sec. of State, May 20, 1876, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67. Microcopy no.46. 
17 The New York Times, May 12, 1876, Wednesday Page 5. 
18 The Times, Jun 03, 1876; p.6; Issue 28646; col D. 
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become a general massacre.19 By Chicago Tribune, the last event at Salonika 
precipitated the doom of Turkey.20   
The notion of insecurity perceived by the Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire was fueled by the press. Even though they had doubts about an impending 
violence directed against them, after the consensus of the press on the danger 
caused by religious fanaticism of the Muslims, their doubts were replaced by 
panic. The dread was not also in the monopoly of the common Christians but it 
was shared by the people who were in the higher echelons of society in the 
Empire. The same rhetoric of “fanaticism” and “imminent massacre of Christians” 
was repeated by all Western representatives in the Ottoman Empire. Even a 
known Turcophile, Ambassador Elliot was urging London to send men-of-war to 
Beşika Bay in case of a need to protect the lives of the Christians in Istanbul.21 He 
also added that all of his colleagues requested from their Governments to send 
men-of-war in addition to the stationary ships already present in the vicinity of 
Istanbul.22  
Not only Istanbul and Salonika but other parts of the Empire as well were 
plagued by the fear of a potential massacre. However, more than any foreigners, 
those who were known as the United States’ citizens, were feeling a greater 
insecurity due their Consular agent’s presumed part in the Salonika incident. 
George Washburn, Director of Robert College at Istanbul, in his dispatch dated 8th 
of May to Horace Maynard claimed that “[…] the state of feeling among the 
Turks here is such as may reproduce on a grand scale the massacre of Salonica. 
[...] This most unfortunate occurrence has been so represented in the Turkish 
                                                 
19 The New York Times, May 22. Page 5 
20 Chicago Daily Tribune, May 12, 1876 p.4. 
21 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, May 9, no.13 a. 
22 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, May 10, no.14. 
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papers as not only to rouse the fanaticism of the Moslem population – which was 
already dangerously excited but also to direct it especially against Americans”.23  
Moreover, at 9th of May, the United States’ ambassador at Smyrna wrote to 
Horace Maynard. He told Maynard that, since the news of the assassination 
reached Smyrna, the Christian community became very excited and concerned. 
He added that, the fear of the redifs forced his colleagues to unanimously call 
their patron state to have them place some men-of-war to Smyrna Bay in case of 
an emergency.24 As a result, Ambassador Maynard, called for Rear Admiral 
Worden, the captain of Franklin stationed at Nice to Aegean Sea in order to 
protect the lives of the United States’ subjects if need arose.  
 
 
4.3. Antagonist or Protagonist; Consular Agent Lazzaro 
 
The Muslim community in the Empire indeed targeted the United States’ 
Consular Agent Lazzaro. Evidently, the reason behind that was the account of 
Mehmed Refet Pasha. In his report, vali of Salonika, claimed that the Bulgarian 
girl was kidnapped as a result of the premeditated actions of the United States’ 
Consular Agent Pericles Hadji Lazzaro. He added that, those Christians numbered 
around one hundred and fifty, who tore the yaşmak and ferâce of the young 
Bulgarian that wanted to be a Muslim, were gathered to the scene by Lazzaro. 
This and other details from the account of Mehmed Refet Pasha was published in 
                                                 
23 George Washburn to Mr. Maynard, Robert College 8 May, Despatches from United States 
Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), Enclosure no.6 in 
no.66, Microcopy no.46. 
24 “Extract from a Letter from Mr.Simitters? US Consul at Smyrna to Mr. Horace Maynard, May 
9,” Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – 
August 10, 1876), Enclosure no.6 in no.66, Microcopy no.46. 
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every official newspaper including of Salonika; Selanik.25 Based on the 
information provided by the Pasha, the Porte sent the details of the incident to its 
representatives abroad.26 This conception about Consul Lazzaro, was also shared 
by European capitals that built their perspectives on the reports received from the 
Porte.27 The report of Mehmed Refet Pasha was as follows; 
 
A Bulgarian girl of Avret-Hisar [...] accompanied by three police zaptiehs 
at her request to the Konak. On the way, two individuals on the part of the 
American Consul, attended by 150 other persons, took her away from the 
zaptiehs [...] having made her get into a carriage, conducted her to the 
house of a certain Hadji Lazzaro. [...] In consequence, about 5.000 
Mussulmans came today (Saturday) to the Governor’s Konak. The local 
authority [...] succeeded in dispersing the assembled mass of people [by 
assuring them] that it  had already taken steps to procure the restitution of 
the girl. [...] However, crowded into the Saatly-Djami Mosque, near the 
Konak to insist upon their demand. As soon as I learnt of this assemblage, 
I took measures for speedy restitution of the girl. I sent several local 
notabilities and superior functionaries to the mosque to persuade the 
gathering to disperse; I immediately sent for armed assistance to the 
fortress [and] to the Imperial corvette Edirne [...] and I ordered the redifs 
to be called out. Meanwhile, the Consuls [...] proceeded to the mosque in 
question, and advanced amidst the crowd, who sought to impede their 
further progress. [...] I hurried to the mosque in company with the cadi 
[kadı] [...] I endeavored also, but in vain, to get the Consuls away. The 
girl at that moment in the house of the Consul of Germany (Mr. Abbott), 
the latter wrote a note directing that she should be immediately brought to 
the mosque. But there was delay in her arrival [...] the mob entirely 
tearing away the window irons, fell upon the Consuls and assassinated 
them both.28 
 
 Consul Lazzaro was a logical choice as a prime suspect in the incident in 
the eyes of the Ottoman officers. It was almost natural to dub him as the puppet 
master in the kidnapping of Stephana at Salonika. At this point to discern why 
                                                 
25 The Times, May 17, 1876; pg. 6; Issue 28631; col D, The Salonica Assassinations. (FROM OUR 
SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.). and F.O. 881-2984, no.25 inclosure 1 Elliot to Derby May 8 
“Telegrams from the Vali [Mehemet Refet Pasha]”. 
26 F.O. 881-2984, Rashid Pasha to Musurus Pasha May 8 – to Earl of Derby, May 13, no.21. 
27 One of them was British Ambassador Elliot, in his telegraph to Earl of Derby he wrote; “The 
report of the American Consul appears to confirm the fact of his having taken a principal part in 
the seizing of the girl, which led to the catastrophe.” F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, May 7, no.5. 
28 The Times, May 17, 1876; pg. 6; Issue 28631; col D, The Salonica Assassinations.  
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Mehmed Pasha acted as he did, one must know more about Consul Lazzaro’s 
identity. Ambassador Maynard, probably due to his own suspicions, made an 
inquiry on Consul Lazzaro and found that he was a Russian subject of Greek 
origin. He was the son of Hadji Lazzaro, deceased at the date, a man in his day of 
wealth and character in Salonika, to whose house in fact Stephana was taken for 
refuge. He was 28 years old and was born and generally lived in Salonika. His 
wife, recently deceased, was an American, a daughter of Mr. Upton of Virginia, 
the Consul of the United States of Geneva, described on all hands as a very 
capable and accomplished woman.29 He was known by his “reputation of being an 
active Slav intriguer”.30  
 The identity of Lazzaro made him the enemy manifested itself in the flesh 
of an individual. He was a Greek national; an ethnic title acted as the prime center 
of suspicion since the Greek Independence. He was also a Russian subject, the 
nemesis of the Ottoman Empire whose political ambitions on the Balkans was a 
known fact. He was also an agent of the United States, a country known as the 
conductor of various missionary activities on the Ottoman soil, and a supporter of 
Greek national movement. The public opinion of the United States was against the 
Ottoman policies on the Balkans, and the press was antagonistic. The attitude of 
the American public opinion was known by most of the Ottoman spheres.31  
 Months after the incident at Salonika, Lazzaro decided to travel to the 
United States. On the cover, it was a vacation to visit an exposition; after being 
exposed to false accusations and upsetting events, his tired psyche called for a 
                                                 
29 Maynard to Sec. of State, May 12, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-
1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.66, Microcopy no.46. 
30 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot to Derby, May 10 (recieved May 19), no.41. 
31 For the reports on the negative approach of the United States on the Ottoman Empire, and 
antagonistic attitude of the American press towards the Porte see; BOA, HR.SYS., Dosya No: 73, 
Gömlek No: 57 and BOA, HR.SYS., Dosya No: 80, Gömlek No: 57. 
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break. In reality Lazzaro was trying to get United States’ citizenship and 
protection.32 During his trip in the United States, he paid a visit to his countryman, 
another influential Greek at Washington; Aristachi Bey, the Ambassador of the 
Porte. Probably considering Aristachi Bey another champion of Greek National 
cause like himself, he spoke to him overtly about his intentions of becoming an 
American citizen. He told the ambassador about his desire to keep this decision 
hidden in order not to upset the Russian authorities in the Ottoman Empire 
prematurely. Although Lazzaro again denied his direct involvement in the kidnap 
of Stephana, Aristarchi Bey reported to the Sublime Porte (along with the other 
points in the conversation with him) that all of his reservations about the 
innocence of Lazzaro in the incident were justified, and he added in one of his 
other reports; 
Mr. Hadgi Lazaro [sic] seems to sympathize with the enemies of our 
country. I certainly had no evidence to produce, besides the support of my 
assertion, [but his] affinity with active agents of Panslavisme and the 
Greek [cause], I say, oblige us to monitor him.33  
 
 
4.4. Revolt in Istanbul 
 
The Muslims were furious about the supposed involvement of Lazzaro in 
the Salonika incident, and their perception of the event was based on the account 
of Mehmed Refet Pasha. Alas, the antagonist of Salonika, disappointing to some, 
was not present at the time of the kidnap at Salonika. This reality was either 
deliberately ignored or the Muslim public was misled by the wrong account of the 
                                                 
32 BOA. HR.SYS., Dosya No: 46, Gömlek No: 2, Aristarchi to Rashid Pacha. 
33 BOA. HR.SYS., Dosya No: 68, Gömlek No: 18, Aristarchi to Server Pacha. 
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vali. In all probability, Mehmed Refet Pasha jumped the gun; he sent his account 
too early without making an investigation and without knowing the details about 
the chain of events that led to the murder of the consuls. In the meantime, there 
was expectancy among the Christians and foreigners in the Ottoman Empire that 
the fury of the Muslims was bound to be transformed into a series of massacres 
directed against them. This expectancy was a making of the press, and the bleak 
atmosphere created by the problems in the Ottoman Balkans. The rumors ran 
rampant and the news of celebration of the murder of two consuls by the Muslims 
of Üsküdar was rubbing the salt in the wound.34 In short, both sides had a 
common point; suspicion towards the other due to the external constructions.  
While everyone was holding their breaths in the Empire, and waiting for 
something terrible to happen, turmoil seized Istanbul. It seemed softas (religious 
students of Sharia) were arming en masse.35 They were selling their precious 
handwritten books to buy arms and ammunitions.36 What purpose other than 
massacring the Christians of the Empire could have been the reason behind the 
armament of the most conservative sect of Istanbul, thought the foreigners and the 
Christians. As a consequence, they too commenced to buy arms for themselves in 
response to softas. In this cold war, if one can dub it, both sides bought revolvers 
and other sort of weapons until the shops of İstanbul were emptied.37  
Ostensibly, the fears of the Christians were justified; the agitated Muslims’ 
wrath was about to be unleashed due to the incident at Salonika.  In the light of 
the recent events, the reporter of the Times claimed that travelers were leaving the 
                                                 
34 The Times, May 15, 1876; pg. 7; Issue 28629; col C, Turkey.  
35 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, May 9, no.13 a. 
36 Mayard to Sec. of State, May 20, 1876, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67, Microcopy no.46. 
37 Mayard to Sec. of State, May 20, 1876, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67, Microcopy no.46. 
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Ottoman soil, resident Europeans were sending away their families and incessant 
applications were being made to Embassies by persons apprehensive of 
approaching danger.38 However, there were some who tried to benefit from the 
apprehension; in the streets of Pera, the Russian Ambassador Ignatiev, paraded his 
three hundred strong men composed of Croats and Montenegrins. He claimed that 
it was necessary to have such a force present at the Russian Embassy to protect 
the lives of the Christians at Pera. He summoned other embassies in the vicinity to 
do the same or offered them refuge if they came under attack.39 General Ignatiev 
acted as an agent provocateur in order to prove the inability of the Porte to 
provide security in its capital and to escalate the tension. Indeed the measures 
taken by him drew attention from Europe; the situation seemed so calamitous if 
mercenaries had to be gathered to protect the lives of the Christians. Even those 
who trusted in the power of the Porte considered that there was a reason to be 
concerned about the Muslim populace. Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha 
seemed to be inert in response to Ignatiev’s mercenary parade. Nevertheless, there 
were some who criticized Ignatiev; 
It is not at all surprising that Gen. Ignatieff [sic] should feel uneasy. 
Conscience makes cowards of us all, and the great diplomatist, when he 
reflects upon all the agony and death [...] which his subtle dealings have 
wrought, must sometimes feel a dart of compunction penetrate through the 
joints of his armour of cynicism.  [...] his Excellency fills his palace at 
night with a bodyguard of several hundred Montenegrins and Croats to 
protect him from the vengeance of the Turkish populace: But the Russian 
ambassador may rest assured that the Turkish populace will not hurt a hair 
of his Excellency’s head; Turkey has no crown of martyrdom to offer to 
General Ignatieff! Indeed, so baseless are his Excellency’s fears that many 
believe them to be assumed and are persuaded that all this defensive 
preparations is mere mise en scene to force, [...] upon Europe the false 
impression that the Turks cannot keep order even in their capital, and that 
the rage of fanaticism boils so fiercely that even the lives of ambassadors 
                                                 
38 The Times, May 13, 1876; pg. 11; Issue 28628; col C, At this momentous crisis in the affairs of 
Eastern 
39 Sir Henry George Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences (London: J. 
Murray, 1922), pp.219-21. 
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are in peril. [...] the inhabitants of the quarter of Pera which is graced by 
the Russian Embassy, are more afraid of the General’s mercenaries than 
they are of the Mahommedans of Stamboul [sic] [...]40 
 
The newspaper the Daily Levant Herald upon publishing the above words 
was suspended by the order of Mahmud Nedim Pasha, but the editor was 
embraced with numerous congratulations by Muslims and Christians, and the 
issue of the article became a rarity, selling at premium prices.41 Moreover, British 
Ambassador, defying and denying Ignatiev’s claims on the security, overtly 
announced that the gates of his consulate would remain open even during the 
night.42  
 Despite the assumptions, softas were not after the lives of the Christians. 
Their real target was the government and the Sultan. As it was discussed at the 
previous chapters, it was clear that Mahmud Nedim Pasha was not equal to the 
strong Âli and Fuad Pashas of older times. Also, he was accused of being 
incompetent during the crisis at Bosnia and Herzegovina, misdirecting the 
Ottoman finances, and -perhaps most importantly- of being under the strong 
influence of Ignatiev.43Şerif Mardin asserts that Mahmud Nedim’s rule was 
incredibly disorganized and was mostly interested in keeping possible rivals out 
of sight.44 Also, the policies of Sultan Abdülaziz were not popular among the 
people and the elite, thus some alliance was formed against him among some 
members of the Porte, composed mostly of Young Ottomans. According to Lütfi 
                                                 
40 The Article of the Daily Levant Herald of 13 May, against the Russian Ambassador, Despatches 
from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), 
Enclosure 5 in no.67, Microcopy no.46. 
41 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1963) pp.328-329. 
42 For an account of Ambassador Elliot see; Sir Henry George Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other 
Diplomatic Experiences (London: J. Murray, 1922). 
43 İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Sultan Abdülâziz Vak’asına Dair Risale”, Belleten vol. VII, no. 28 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1943), pp. 349-373, p.353. 
44 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1962) p.62. 
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Efendi, it was those Young Ottomans under the influence of Mithat Pasha that 
incited softas to rise against the government.45 Softas were not chosen as the 
torchbearers for reform, in fact, they represented, the largest organizable group in 
the capital, since most soldiers were on campaign on the Balkans. In addition, the 
rumors hastened the process and agitated the public opinion; the latest one was 
that the sultan requested thirty thousand Russian troops for his protection,46 
another repetition of the deplorable events following the defeats against Mehmed 
Ali of Egypt. For, at 1833 Sultan Mahmud II turned to the Russians for help to 
defend his capital against the approaching forces of Mehmed Ali, and allowed 
them to land troops near Istanbul, thus deeply hurting the Muslim pride in the 
empire.  
 The discontented softas held a meeting at Fatih Sultan Mehmed Mosque at 
10 May. Contemporary chronicler Lütfi Efendi wrote that; on the May 10th, 
similar to the Janissaries refusing to drink their daily soups as a sign of revolt, the 
softas refused to attend the classes in Istanbul. Instead, they paraded the streets, 
shouting that the Empire should divert from the Russian bearing, and Mahmud 
Nedim Pasha should be replaced – not surprisingly they suggested Mithat Pasha’s 
name as the replacement.47  
The plot had a deep root; according to their plans, Abdülaziz was to be 
replaced by Şehzade Murad, the highly intelligent and cultivated nephew of the 
Sultan.48 By Horace Mayard, softas demanded four heads; “The first was the 
donkey’s at Dolmabahçe, meaning the Sultan, [...] then the Grand Vizier’s, the 
                                                 
45 İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Sultan Abdülâziz Vak’asına Dair Risale”, Belleten vol. VII, no. 28 
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Şeyhülislam’s and Russian Ambassador’s.”49 The most striking of all, the same 
softas presented as the would-be-murderers of the Christians, like an antithesis of 
assumptions of all of the Westerners and Christians, demanded one more thing; 
“severe punishment of murderers of two Consuls at Salonika, and to provide the 
necessary sentences to those who violated the customs and the laws of the country 
by instigating this murderous act”.50 
On Friday the 12th the softas filled the streets of Istanbul once again. Their 
tone and demands were getting harsher; Mahmud Nedim Pasha barely escaped a 
pack of softas marching to Babıali, in all probability whose aim was to execute 
him. Not so later that Sultan Abdülaziz after being convinced on the inability of 
Mahmud Nedim to suppress the movement, announced the change in the 
government replacing him with Mehmed Rüşdü Paşa. The Sultan pronounced on 
the change of government directed to the new Grand Vizier; “because of the 
demands of the people that I bestow upon you this post”51, this signified that since 
the insurrections of janissaries for the first time an unrest affected the will of the 
Sultan and the names in the power.  
 
  
                                                 
49 Mayard to Sec. of State, May 20, 1876, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, 
(1818-1909), Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.67, Microcopy no.46. 
50 “Talebe lisaniyle meydana çıkan teklifler bunlar imiş; [...] 4- Selânikte konsolosları katledenler 
kemal-i şiddetle tedib ve memleketin âdât ve kavaninine mugayir olarak bu katl maddesine sebeb 
olanların dahi mücâzât-ı lâzimeleri verilmeli.” İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Sultan Abdülâziz Vak’asına 
Dair Risale,” Belleten vol. VII, no. 28 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1943), pp. 349-373, p.356. 
51 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, cilt.VII Islahat Fermanı Devri (1861 – 1876) (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, 2003), p.124. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
SALONIKA REVISITED 
 
 
 
5.1. The Trials and Punishments 
 
While Istanbul was boiling, the Ottoman ship with the imperial commissioner 
Vahan Efendi, the new governor-general Eşref Pasha and French and German 
delegates on board, arrived in Salonika at May 9. The Ottoman reinforcement to 
the area was about six hundred men.1 The former vali, Mehmed Refet Pasha used 
stern measures just after the incident and night curfews were in effect in the city. 
Although everything seemed quiet, Christians and foreigners of Salonika were 
still reluctant to go out, or trust in the Ottoman troops. For, it was all too well 
known about the iniquitous exploits of the redifs all around the Empire. In all 
probability, the fear about the redifs was well grounded, because even after the 
arrival of the commissioner, no arrests were made for two days due to the mistrust 
of the new vali’s towards the redifs. The foreign delegates and the consuls of 
Salonika were complaining that the number of troops were insufficient to enforce 
                                                 
1 FO 881-2984, The Secretary to the Admiralty to Lord Tenterden, May 9, no.13. 
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order and to carry out the arrests. The calm in the city was interpreted as the 
silence before the storm by the foreign delegates.2 Newspapers published that the 
restlessness was spreading, and Salonika was at the brink of anarchy since not 
enough troops were available; however, these claims were rejected by Eşref 
Pasha, who claimed in his dispatch to the Porte that perfect tranquility was 
prevailing in the city, and there were no signs of future troubles among the 
inhabitants.3 Indeed, soon after his report, the vali was reinforced by nizamiye 
(regular) soldiers. After a quick investigation, he ordered the arrest of thirty five 
individuals; which was also confirmed by Blunt’s report.4 No resistance or 
disturbance occurred in the city during the detaining of the culprits, and they were 
taken to the Ottoman ironclad Edirne. The arrests continued throughout the week, 
the number of the culprits in custody reached to fifty three until the end of the 
week. All interrogations were carried out on board of recently arrived Ottoman 
flagship Selimiye.5  
 The konak was given to the French delegate Gillet, his German colleague 
Robert –who were sent there by their ambassadors- and British Consul Blunt for 
their safety and for the good of the investigation. Vahan Efendi, another new 
resident in the konak, was informing the foreign representatives with the 
developments, while Eşref Pasha was supervising the whole military operation on 
the security of the city and the safe conduct of arrests on horseback.6 Consul Blunt 
claimed that the commissioners carried out their duties in an able and firm 
manner, and the town during these arrests remained tranquil.7 The ships of war 
                                                 
2 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya no: 124, Gömlek No:96.  
3 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya no: 554, Gömlek No:3. 
4 FO 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, May 14, no.23. 
5 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya no: 554, Gömlek No.4. 
6 FO 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 14, Inclosure 4 in no.64. 
7 FO 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 14, Inclosure 1 in no.53. 
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continued to reach the Salonika bay as the investigation and arrests were carried 
out. Below is the list ships anchored at Salonika by 14th of May; 
 
Nation Name Description Guns Crew Commanders When 
Arrived 
Turkish Edirne Corvette 18 160 Osman Bey  
Turkish  Iclaliye Corvette-
ironclad 
5 180 Rıza Bey  
Turkish Selimiye Frigate 52 430 Hasan Bey May 8 
Turkish Sahir Aviso 2 35 Omer Bey  
French  Gladiateur Aviso 4 70 De Coudinon May 9 
British Bittern Gunboat 3 95 Anstruther May 9 
Greek Salamine Aviso 2 60 Chriasses May 9 
Greek George I Ironclad 4 125 Sakturis May 10 
Russian Ascold Corvette 8 309 Tirtov May 10 
Turkish Muhbîr-i 
Surure 
Frigate 16 319 Ali Rıza Bey May 13 
Italian Maria Pia Frigate-
ironclad 
19 … Chinca May 13 
French  Cheteau 
Renaud 
Corvette 7 210 Grivel May 13 
British Swiftsure Ironclad 14 500 Ct.Baird May 14 
Italian … Gun-vessel …  … … May 14 
 
 At May 14th, a small crisis of etiquette took place in the Salonika bay 
between the Ottoman and French vessels, which transcended the tension for a 
short time. Consul Blunt in his dispatch to Istanbul told that; when French 
corvette Chateau Renaud anchored in the Salonika bay, saluted the Russian Rear-
Admiral Boutakoff’s ship which was also anchored. According to marine customs 
he should also have also saluted the town of Salonika and the Ottoman Vice 
Admiral Hasan Bey’s frigate Selimiye. Nevertheless, as time passed, it was clear 
that French corvette would not salute the Ottoman presence. Thus, the Ottoman 
Vice Admiral sent one of his officers to Chateau Renaud in order to demand 
explanations for their action. The French captain replied that “he could not salute 
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as his nation was in mourning”.8 The reply was dismissed and rejected by the 
Ottoman side. All this happened right at the time of the disembarkment of 
Ottoman marines with the objective to secure the roads and streets leading to the 
Frank and Greek quarters. While the anxiety reached the delegates residing in the 
konak, the German representative stepped out and intervened. With his 
intervention, the required salutes were exchanged and this inopportune event 
finished.9 Nevertheless, it was the first sign of French enmity towards the 
Ottoman side during the aftermath of the murders of two consuls. 
 At 15th of May, the trials of the murders began on board of Selimiye. 
During the trials, along with Vahan Efendi and Eşref Pasha, French and German 
delegates, and British Consul Blunt was present, nonetheless not a representative 
was called to attend the trials from the American Consulate. According to the 
investigations and based on the testimonies of the witnesses, said the Ottoman 
commissioners; six of the culprits were confirmed as the murderers of the two 
consuls.10 They were sentenced to capital punishment to be carried out at 16th of 
May. Nevertheless, during the trials, French representative Gillet and his German 
colleague who was influenced by him insisted on the same form of treatment 
which was bestowed upon the arrested culprits and also demanded a decisive 
punitive action, against the Ottoman officials -without exception of the former 
Governor General- who were, according to them, equally responsible for the 
murder of the two consuls.11 The proposal was refused by the Ottoman 
commissioners on the claim that the power to judge and punish any Ottoman 
officer belonged to the Sublime Porte alone but not to a mixed tribunal composed 
                                                 
8 FO 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 14, Inclosure 4 in no.64. 
9 FO 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 14, Inclosure 4 in no.64. 
10 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya no: 554, Gömlek No:3. 
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of foreign representatives. The move by the Ottoman commissioners found 
support from Consul Blunt and thus the trials of Ottoman officers were left to 
Istanbul.12  
 On May 16th, on the quay of Salonika, the sentences of six primary culprits 
were carried out in the presence of the Ottoman commissioners, French and 
German delegates and Consul Blunt.13 Early in the morning, native Jews came to 
the quay with picks in their hands, prepared holes for the scaffolds which were 
brought by the Ottoman ships. The scene was protected by the three sides with 
lines of infantry; moreover a regiment of cavalry was ready nearby in case of a 
riot. Soon after the preparations, the six culprits came with boats from Selimiye, 
on board of which they had been condemned to death, with a company of 
Ottoman troops and an imam. Water offered to them and they were allowed to 
perform their ablutions. The imam from Selimiye spoke to them and they said 
some quick prayers. Some gypsies and Albanians were hired as executioners; they 
adjusted the ropes and made the final preparations. The first to suffer, Consul 
Blunt told, was an Arab; he having refused to be polluted by the touch of an 
Albanian, kicked the chair he mounted under him which was borrowed from a 
nearby café. Blunt also added that the other five were almost eager to die since 
they helped the executioners to do their jobs. The witnessing mob was indifferent 
to these scenes and they dispersed soon after the executions. The Times 
correspondent claimed that nine scaffolds were erected for the executions and he 
added, the  fact that six people were hanged instead of nine created some 
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confusion,14 nevertheless it was a common practice to prepare more scaffolds than 
needed just in case. 
The standing of the punished was neither satisfactory for the foreign press 
nor for the French led representation in Salonika. Since the six were from the 
lowest strata of the society, there was a shared apprehension among the foreigners 
that the real instigators of the murders still remained unpunished. This notion 
echoed among the European capitals, and again Ottoman diplomats faced 
accusations and complaints on this issue.15 The press supported the notion and 
championed for the punishment of people of higher position to prevent possible 
bursts of the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. The Times wrote; “In order to 
produce an impression they must search out the instigators and get hold of a few 
gentlemen who are called Bey or Effendi [sic]. By executing one or two of them 
in the midst of the towns […] they may instill a little terror into the souls of these 
fanatics, who we may now be sure, will only await another opportunity for 
carrying out whatever designs they harbour.”16 
The call of the foreign press and European capitals was not without 
reason. During the investigations, although no reflections found in the accounts of 
the Consul Blunt or in the Ottoman correspondence, a certain Emin Efendi’s role 
was like a slim shadow behind the reasons of the whole event.17 Emin Efendi was 
an inhabitant of Salonika, and a member of the city council. His name was 
mentioned here and there during the incident; he was even present among the 
delegate which went to Saatli Camii while the two consuls were trapped in there. 
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From the moment when the news of the incident became known to the public, 
newspapers were pointing fingers to this Emin Efendi, claiming that it was him 
who had Stephana kidnapped at Bogdantza to be destined to his personal harem, 
and not only that, when Stephana was taken from him at the Salonika train station, 
he thus tried to agitate the local Muslims for a joint effort for the rescue of the 
girl. Most likely based on the account of Lazzaro; a copy of the similar narration 
about the causality of the incident was also repeated by Meropi Anastassiadou.18 
Lazzaro’s detailed report to Maynard in which he claimed that almost certainly 
Stephana’s purpose of arriving at Salonika was to enter the harem of Emin Efendi, 
who according to him; “does not enjoy a good reputation, and it is he that public 
opinion points out as being the principal instigator of the mischief”.19  
These accusations were not groundless or were not a manifestation of an 
attempt to divert the attention on the Lazzaro’s role in the event, on the contrary; 
the Ottoman commissioner Vahan Efendi was very suspicious whether indeed 
Emin Efendi was a prime ringleader in the incident. During the interrogations at 
Stephana’s village Bogdantza, Vahan Efendi to each interrogated individual, 
without any exception, inquired on their acquaintance of Emin Efendi. Vahan 
Efendi’s conviction was clear since in order to find at least a bit of information, he 
described Emin Efendi to each and every one, in case they did not know his name. 
All of the villagers answered as they did not know who he was, as if they made a 
secret pact not to tell anything. Only once a villager admitted that he had heard of 
him, since Emin Efendi was a vekil (deputy) of a plantation near Bogdantza.20 
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20 The conversation was as follows; 
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With this information Emin Efendi was linked to Bogdantza. Vahan Efendi thus 
interrogated Emin Efendi too, in which, he admitted that he was in the same train 
with Stephana but he neither saw nor heard of her or her kidnapping at the train 
station. Even so, Vahan Efendi because of little confidence he inspired, had him 
exiled for the duration of three years to Tripoli Africa,21 defined by The Times; 
“no very unpleasant place”.22  
Along with the six who were executed and Emin Efendi; three were 
condemned to prison for life with hard labor, two to prison for ten years with hard 
labor, eleven condemned to prison for five years with hard labor, three to prison 
for three years with hard labor, one to prison for one month and an eleven years 
old boy, was whipped for stealing the watch of the German consul after he was 
murdered, in total, thirty five culprits were trialed and punished.23 Ottoman 
officers were not tried by this court but instead they held in the city until an envoy 
from Istanbul arrived to judge them. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Q. [...] Emin Effendi, connais-tu cette personne? –R. Je l’ai entendu dire comme Kiatab de 
Mahkemé, mais je ne le connais pas personnellement. [...] 
Q. Tu dis d’avoir entendu parler d’Emin Effendi, à quel propos en as-tu entendu? –R. Comme 
Vekil de Chehimé Khasun, femme de Fellah Effendi, 1er Gouverneur des moraies, c’est à ce 
propos que j’ai entendu parler de lui. 
Q. Cette Chehima possede-t-elle des propriétés ici? – R. Elle possede le Tschiplik de Madjicova. 
Q. Très bien, puisqu’Emin Effendi est le Vekil du Tschiplik de Madjicova sans doute il y serait 
venu, l’as-tu vu? –R. Non; jamais je ne l’ai vu. 
F.O. 881-2984, Evidence taken at the Village of Bogdantza, Blunt to Derby, June 21 1876, 
Inclosure 4 in no.106, “L’Exposé de Feizoullah Aga, un des Membres du Conseil des Vieillards du 
Village”. 
21 F.O. 881-2984, Statement relative to Convictions of Individuals implicated in Murder of French 
and German Consuls, Blunt to Derby, June 18, Inclosure 2 in no. 105. 
22 The Times, Wednesday, June 21, 1876; pg. 6; Issue 28661; col E. Salonica Inquiry. 
23 F.O. 881-2984, Statement relative to Convictions of Individuals implicated in Murder of French 
and German Consuls, Blunt to Derby, June 18, Inclosure 2 in no. 105. 
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5.2. The Funerals of the French and German Consuls 
 
 The question on the security provided by the Ottoman officers in Salonika 
was resulted in a delay of the funerals of the French and German Consuls. The 
Porte had promised in the ambassadorial meeting at 7th of May “that the funeral of 
the two Consul shall take place publicly at Salonica, with every attendant pomp 
and ceremony”.  Since May 11th, there was discretion in the conduct of arrests at 
Salonika. Consul Blunt reported that the Ottoman officers did not have enough 
forces under their command to guarantee that the funeral ceremonies would be 
conducted with every mark of honor and they could take place without risk of 
further disturbances.24 Eşref Pasha was constantly corresponding with the Porte 
about the safe conduct of the funerals. Meanwhile, the Russian Admiral was 
strongly in favor of landing an armed party of marines, from each of the European 
ships if possible, to act as a task force to keep the order during the honors of the 
funerals. The Russian Admiral added, this ostensibly firing squads, would carry 
blank cartridges in their ammunition pouches.25 This plan was gradually 
abandoned, because of a strong possibility to incite the local Muslims to take 
action, by landing troops under arms. Nevertheless, the funerals were constantly 
postponed even after the trials and the executions of the six culprits. 
  While the funerals were postponed, another forgotten aspect of the 
murders became evident. The tragedies of families of the two consuls were almost 
forgotten. Although the Porte promised to pay compensations to the families of 
the consuls, the other promise about the conduct of the funerals were still not 
carried out. The delegates of France and Germany, and Consul Blunt received 
                                                 
24 F.O. 78-2495, Blunt to Elliot, May 11, no.23. 
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letters from Abbott and Moulin families. Mrs. Catherine P. Rallie, cousine of 
Henry Abbott, wrote the following letter to Blunt; 
 […]I beg of you, in the name of all the family, to have a special meeting 
and take strong measures for the quietness of the place as the funeral must 
take place tomorrow, otherwise this delay will be paid by poor aunt’s life, 
who is today very bad, and insists upon the funeral taking place today; but 
at least we have succeeded in pacifying her, promising that early 
tomorrow it will take place.26 
 
Thus, Consul Blunt insisted upon a quiet funeral with only the delegates and the 
families attending, without any pomp or military presence. The French 
representative Gillet complained to Paris about the lack of cooperation on Blunt’s 
account. From there the issue made known Blunt, and he answered for the 
accusations by stating that he was just concerned about the humane side of the 
tragedy, as such was the pain of mother Abbott as having the disfigured body of 
his son in her house for days.27 Nevertheless, the idea was rejected by the 
delegates who insisted on a flamboyant funeral ceremony. 
 The awaited funeral took place at 19th of May, three days after the 
executions. In the morning, fifteen sailors from Austrian, British, French, German, 
Greek, Italian and Russian ships assembled at Salonika quay. Vahan Efendi, the 
delegate of France and Germany, Russian, and French admirals, joined a large 
body of the deceased proceeded to the Roman Catholic Church for the ceremony 
where the body of Consul Jules Moulin was placed. The church was decorated 
and crowded for the event. Inside the church, French and German sailors were 
standing as guards of honor, meanwhile Russian and British sailors lined up 
outside. After the ceremonies, the coffin of Moulin was carried to the French ship 
which was waiting at the harbor to sail with it to France. The coffin was escorted 
                                                 
26 F.O. 881-2984, Mrs.Ralli (Catherine P. Ralli cousine of the consul) May 10, Inclosure 3 in 
no.64. 
27 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Elliot, May 12, Inclosure 2 in no.64. 
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by a company headed by the clergy, the vali of Salonika; Eşref Pasha, Vahan 
Efendi and a forward guard of Ottoman soldiers.28 On the coffin was placed the 
sword, the uniform and the decorations of the late consul. At the either sides of 
the coffin were the French and German sailors and they were followed by the 
officers of representatives of the present powers at Salonika. Upon reaching the 
shore, the coffin was delivered to the French Naval Chaplains to be put on the 
French flagship. As the body left the shore, salutes fired from the ships. The 
ceremony took about two hours, after that the crowd moved to the Greek church 
of St. Nicola for the funeral of Henry Abbott.29 
 The coffin of the German consul Abbot was placed at the center of the 
church. The sailors took their positions in the same manner as in the first funeral. 
A slight change was on the position of the honor guards; German troops 
positioned themselves at the right side of the coffin and the French at the left. The 
burial services were carried out by the participation of the entire clergy of 
Salonika’s Orthodox Greek churches. The body of Henry Abbot was buried in the 
cathedral’s cemetery in the Greek quarter of the city. This ceremony took about 
half an hour, and both of the funerals took place with no sign of atrocity and in 
perfect tranquility.30 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 It was not unheard-of to Ottoman soldiers giving their respects to the non-Muslim clergy or be 
present in a Christian of Jewish funeral as guards of honor, in fact, since Tanzimat, Ottoman 
soldiers were ordered to turn and present arms whenever a Patriach or a metropolitan passed 
before them, they were also present in the funerals of a non-Muslim who had been in the service of 
the state, despite the presence of the crucifix and such. Salâhi R. Sonyel, “Tanzimat and its Effects 
on the non-Muslim Subjects of the Ottoman Empire”, in Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası 
Sempozyumu, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), pp.353-389, p.371. 
29 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, May 17 (received May 30) no.60. 
30 F.O. 881-2984, Blunt to Derby, May 17 (received May 30) no.60. 
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5.3. Trials and Re-Trials of the Ottoman Officers 
 
 The European capitals were satisfied with the conduct of the funerals by 
the Ottoman officers. Only two issues remained unresolved in the eyes of the 
European powers; first, the punishment of the Ottoman officers who neglected 
their duties during the murders of the two consuls and second, the compensations 
to be paid to the families of the victims. Nevertheless, these two issues, however 
seemed unlikely after the funerals, were to be the future causes of more crises 
between the capitals and the Sublime Porte. 
 During the inquiry at Salonika, the delegates excluding Britain, were 
trying to act as the judges, but according to the Foreign Minister Reşhid Pasha; 
“the duty of the delegates was to watch the proceedings, to endeavor to elicit all 
the facts, and to express their opinions freely as to the culpability of the accused, 
but not to take part in pronouncing the sentences”, and all the ambassadors 
concurred with this notion.31  The Sublime Porte insisted that the crisis occurred 
due to the negligence of its officers who were under its jurisdiction; since the 
positions of the officers were bestowed by the Porte, thus the Porte was the maker 
of these men and the Porte alone could unmake them. The Porte took the full 
responsibility of its officers and did not dismiss the issue as an exceptional or 
individual case. 
  Apparently, the Porte was cautious enough to dodge possible accusations 
from the European powers that the promises given at Gülhane Hatti of 1839 and 
Islahat Fermanı of 1856, once again breached. The Porte according the second 
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point of the Ambassadorial meeting of 7th of May, -concerning “that all the 
provincial valis (governors-generals) shall be instructed to exercise redoubled 
vigilance in order to maintain public tranquility and that they shall be held directly 
responsible for any disturbances arising in the provinces under their 
administration”32- promulgated a memorandum by the hands of the Grand Vizier 
to all of the provincial governments a list of orders soaked with warnings. The 
tone, the chosen words and the established causality of the event is of cardinal 
importance in order to grasp the Porte’s own view of the Salonika incident, and its 
desire to appear in the eyes of the foreign powers as the loyal preserver of the 
promised reform ideas. The memorandum was like this; the causes of the murders 
were portrayed as simply Stephana’s decision and the mob’s reckless endeavor in 
order to rescue her. The two consuls were killed because they happened to be in 
the scene, nevertheless, the action was dubbed as a terrible, inhumane crime 
committed against the representatives of the great powers. It went on implicating 
that the crime deeply saddened the Sultan who ordered severe punishment of the 
culprits. Thus, the memorandum delicately referred to Gülhane Hattı of 1839, 
with a duplication of the points on how the state’s primary duty was the protection 
of lives and properties of its subjects. It stated that the lives, the properties and the 
dignity (the same order of words in the text of Gülhane of 1839)33 of merchants 
and diplomats of foreign origin, residing at the Ottoman Empire were also under 
the protection of the state, ergo the officers of the Empire, from lowest to highest 
rank, were entirely responsible for the protection of them. Burdened with these 
points, the officers were ordered to take lessons from the Salonika incident and 
                                                 
32 Mayard to Secretary of State, Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey, (1818-1909), 
Roll 30 v.29 (January 1 – August 10, 1876), no.66, Microcopy no.46. 
33 Ali Reşad, Devlet-i Âli Osmani’nin Tarih-i Islahatı (Istanbul: 1328) p.477.  
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once again pay utmost attention to the safeguard of lives of the Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects and the lives of the foreign representatives as well.34       
 As the memorandum dictated, the Ottoman Officers were trialed. The trials 
were not carried out until early June due to the chaos in the capital caused by the 
coup d’état that toppled Abdülaziz and placed Murad V to his place. With the 
evidence gathered from Salonika by Commissioner Vahan Efendi, at 2nd of June 
the military judges for the court-martial left Istanbul for Salonika.35 Vahan Efendi 
in his letter to the Grand Vizierate explained the decisions of the court-martial in 
detail. According to the interrogations and the evidences gathered, the court was 
convinced that; although in his statement, Colonel Salim Bey declared that he was 
not aware of the mob’s aim, he nevertheless strived to take the necessary 
precautions, but he eventually failed to prevent the murders and was charged for 
not preventing the mutilation of the bodies of the two consuls.36 The commander 
of the citadel’s garrison Miralay Atta Bey, was charged because he did not send 
the necessary troops to the Saatli Camii in time, and diverted some of the troops 
from their ways. The commander of the Ottoman ironclad Iclaliye, Izzet Bey was 
charged for not drawing some troops despite his awareness on the severity of the 
situation. Coming to the former vali Mehmed Refet Pasha; he was charged for not 
dispersing the crowd gathered in front of the konak for whose purpose was the 
reclamation of Stephana, and for not rescuing the two consuls when they were 
surrounded in the mosque and for not ordering an armed assault on the mob when 
the situation became dire. Vahan Efendi noted that, the foreign delegates strongly 
accused the aforementioned officers of intentionally leaving the two consuls to the 
                                                 
34 BOA, C.DH., Dosya No: 13, Gömlek No: 609. 
35 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 2, inclosure 1 no.76. 
36 For a financial report on the inquiry of Vahan Efendi refer to; BOA, İ.ŞD, Dosya No: 36, 
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mercy of the mob. Nevertheless, Vahan Efendi added that, there was no evidence 
supporting the allegations of the delegates, and no indication of whatsoever on 
ulterior motives.37 
 The decisions came swiftly at 12th of June; Colonel Salim Bey was 
condemned to degradation and imprisonment for one year; commander of the 
citadel’s garrison Miralay Atta Bey, and the commander of the Ottoman ironclad 
Iclaliye Izzet Bey were both were sentenced to imprisonment for forty-five days. 
Apparently, former vali Mehmed Refet Pasha did not receive any form of formal 
punishment.38  
 The French and German sides became infuriated with the degrees of the 
punishments. Again, the sides forwarded their complaints to the Porte’s 
representatives in their capitals about the insufficiency of the punishments given 
to the officials, whom, according to them, were the most accountable after the 
murderers themselves.39 According to the capitals, the delegates’ struggle with the 
Ottoman authorities to apply justice was a complete failure. Also, British consul 
Blunt was accused of not exerting his influence in support of the representations 
of the delegates, thus, he was named as a prime reason for the lenient treatment of 
the trialed Ottoman officers.40 Faced with the recent developments, German 
representation at London asserted that the government of Germany might find 
themselves at the same situation of Britain after the murders at Jeddah 1858, and 
might enforce their claims like British ships of war did, in short by the appliance 
                                                 
37 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya No:516, Gömlek No:52. 
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39 BOA, HR.TO., Dosya No: 122, Gömlek No: 58. 
40 It is striking that at the same British subjects of Salonika sent a joint letter expressing their 
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of gunboat diplomacy.41 The fears of the Porte were resurrected on the nature of 
the Salonika Incident. 
 At 14th of June, the decision of the military court was annulled for the 
reasons no other than the complaints from Germany and France. Prince Bismarck 
himself, was annoyed with the whole conduct of the trials, and resented deeply 
from the resolution of the Porte to bar the delegates from being the judges. 
Bismarck was inclined to consider the Porte as a culprit in the incident; his tone 
was very strong and imperative in favor of reparation. The directives of Bismarck 
to his ambassador Baron Werther, put the latter in a difficult position as “the 
ambassador’s own disposition has been to act with moderation.”42 The opposite 
could be said for the French ambassador Count de Bourgoing, who acted with his 
personal hatred to humiliate the Porte without considering any form of 
temperance.43 Count de Bourgoing, in his private talk with Ambassador Elliot, 
made it clear that for the last six years, (he meant after the defeat of France 
against the Prussians at 1870) his country “had been exposed wanton affronts and 
mortification the misérables Turks”, and now, since the recovery of France, it was 
again in their power to punish the Porte, Elliot summarized the words of de 
Bourgoing as “I will not further repeat Count de Bourgoing’s words, and will only 
state that they were suspectible of no possible interpretation expecting that […] 
far from whishing to avert measures likely to be fatal to Turkey, will only be too 
glad to contribute to her ruin.”44 This time instead of Salonika, Istanbul was 
designated as the place of the new trial which was ordained to begin immediately, 
yet without the presence of Consul Blunt; he was not summoned to İstanbul as his 
                                                 
41 F.O. 881-2984, Derby to Odo Russell, June 14, no.68. 
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44 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 6 (received June 16), no.88. 
 81
colleagues considered him biased in favor of the Ottomans.45 It was clear that the 
new trial was not pressed by the two sides for truth and reconciliation but to 
disgrace the Porte, and injure it as much as possible.  
 During the second trial, the German and the French ambassadors insisted 
on capital sentences on the accused officers. The delegates intimidated the 
Ottoman authorities by threatening to withdraw from the court and break off the 
relations with the Porte, if their demands were not satisfied.46 Foreign Minister 
Reşid Pasha himself had to intervene to avert the ambassadors of their insistences. 
He told the ambassadors, how sincerely the Porte considered the cases in the 
affair, and requested them not to force down their demands about the infliction of 
any punishment beyond that which was sanctioned by the law of the Ottoman 
Empire.47 As a consequence, the ambassadors were coerced not to be adamant on 
the capital punishments.48 
 The three officers were re-trialed, this time joined with the former vali of 
Salonika. According to the Sublime Porte’s own correspondence, the trial was no 
longer a case of justice in the internal affairs, but it was a political case concerning 
the diplomatic relations between the Porte and the Great Powers. The reasons for 
the re-trial was clear; the punishments in the first one were not considered 
adequate by the foreign powers, and it was not prudent to prolong the affair while 
many other important problems dominating the scene.49 Thus, according to the 
decisions of the special court; Mehmed Refet Pasha due his negligence to prevent 
the affair was sentenced to imprisonment in the General Staff (Bâb-ı Ser’askerî), 
the other officers sentences were increased because of their delay in executing the 
                                                 
45 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 15, no.81. 
46 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 19 (received June 30), no.104. 
47 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, May 28 (received June 16), no.87. 
48 F.O. 881-2984, Elliot to Derby, June 28, no.102. 
49 BOA, Irade Dahiliye, Dosya No: 1295, Gömlek No: 101782. 
 82
orders which would prevent the two murders. Colonel Salim Bey condemned to 
degradation and fifteen years of hard labor (küreğe konulmasına…), Rıza Bey to 
ten years of imprisonment in a fortress and degradation, and finally Captain Atta 
Bey to three years of imprisonment in fortress and degradation. Rıza Bey was 
designated to Rhodes and Atta Bey to Lesbos Isle to suffer their punishments.50  
 At the epilogue of the event, still the French and German sides were 
seeking out for more means to debase the Porte. Certainly, the revised sentences 
on the officers satisfied the two sides, nonetheless their perpetual interference 
during the creation of the decisions encouraged them to demand more. The 
German and the French ambassadors required these three to be fulfilled; 
1st. That the condemned officers shall be removed to Salonica [sic], and 
the sentences on them read in presence of troops and the delegates. 
2nd. That a written shall be given that the late Governor shall never again 
have any civil or military employment  
3rd. That the whole of the indemnity to the families of the Consuls, 
amounting to 40.000 (900.000 Francs) L. Turkish shall be paid 
[immediately].51 
 
The Grand Vizier had to respond that the first two of the demands were 
contradictory of the Ottoman Law, and for the last point, he said, the treasury was 
empty. The demands were in form of an ultimatum as British Ambassador Elliot’s 
own words defined them.52 The Porte tried to protest the demands, recalling the 
promises of the ambassadors to Raşid Pasha to not insist on nothing inconsistent 
with the Ottoman Law, it did not have any effect. Paris gave a deadline as the mid 
August for the full compliance to the points of its ambassador, or else it made it 
known to the Ottoman Ambassador that, noncompliance would result in severance 
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of the relations with the Porte.53 The Grand Vizier still had hard time to 
understand what was behind this vindictive spirit, “the demand for a written 
engagement not to employ the Governor-General is, he said, an aggravation of the 
legal sentence passed, and designed simply as a humiliation to the Porte”, as for 
the demand of that sum of money, he added that he hardly understood “how 
professedly friendly Powers, acquainted with the absolute destitution of the 
Turkish Treasury, could have put forward this.”54 Nevertheless, Elliot advised him 
to accept the demands, although he also expressed that the demands were 
evidently carrying unfairness to the Ottoman authorities who showed nothing but 
willingness to do justice, and referring to the payment he noted it was “hardly 
what was expected from the Representatives of friendly Powers.”55  
August the 21st marked the day of silence for the echoes of the Salonika 
Incident. The reviewed sentences of the Ottoman officers were read at their 
former posts at Salonika, in presence of its habitants. After this the German and 
the French flags were hoisted at the Salonika citadel. Guns from the citadel 
saluted each flag with twenty-one guns, the salutes returned by the German and 
the French ships of war anchored in the Salonika Bay.56 While the foreign ships of 
war leaving Salonika, Ottoman Treasury was making the final transactions of the 
amount which were conjured to pay the final indemnity to the families of the 
murdered consuls. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
“I should also report to your Lordship that the manifestations of public joy have not 
been interrupted or disfigured by any act of disorder or ill feeling. The quay, the 
principal streets, the bazaars, and the coffee-houses were crowded with Turks, Greeks, 
Jews, Levantines and Europeans, all mingled together, men, women, and children, as if 
their national and religious feelings had not been wounded by the recent horrid 
occurrences; antipathy of race appeared to been forgotten and forgiven.” 
 
Consul Blunt to Ambassador Elliot, on the celebrations in Salonika upon the news of 
Enthronement of Sultan Murad V right after the Salonika Incident.1 
 
 The Salonika Incident was not a political crisis but its results were indeed 
profoundly politicized. To understand post factum politicization of this incident 
by the European powers, one must embrace a larger vision on history of the 19th 
century Ottoman Empire. In the timeline of the events, introduction of Tanzimat 
reforms can mark the inauguration of the integration of Ottoman Empire to 
European inner politics. True, the Ottoman Empire was never a peripheral actor in 
Europe, but it was to some extent an alien factor, and with Tanzimat, it adopted a 
more European look – at least for its superstructure. This recognition and 
                                                 
1 Great Britain, Parliament, Commons. Parliamentary Papers, 1876: Turkey No. 4 (1876). 
Correspondence Respecting The Murder of the French and German Consuls at Salonica, n.56 
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acceptance opened the flood gates for the penetration of new ideologies and 
innovations. Digesting these renovations was painful for the Ottoman Society, as 
Cemal Kafadar pointed out, this “Westoxication” may even quickened its 
dismemberment and its fall, just like the effects of Perestroika for the Soviet 
Union.2 The reforms gave European powers collateral right to intervene more to 
the inner functions of the Empire. Moreover, the Crimean War positioned the 
Porte in the core of Europe, arguably not for the sympathy of the European 
powers towards it but because of the apprehension from Russian advance. The 
timing of the incident is of cardinal importance in order to understand the 
politicization and the grave nature attributed to it by Europe. The Balkans was in 
flames during May 1876, rebellions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have spread to 
Bulgaria. Serbia was preparing for war under Russian General and Panslavist 
Cherniyayev while volunteers were filling the ranks of his army from Russia. The 
news of recent atrocities in the Balkans (i.e. Batak) was barely reached Europe 
when this incident occurred. It was not surprising that European public opinion 
perceived the incident as if it was related to the entire package of recent crises in 
the Ottoman Empire.   
 The Balkans for various reasons was in the eyesight of Europe. It was the 
westernmost part of the Ottoman Empire, home of ethnicities who shared 
principals of Christianity with Europe, thus it was easier to establish bonds 
empathy with them. Even though, the conditions of the Balkan Christian were not 
worse than its Muslim neighbor or a Russian muzhik, it was more convenient for 
Europe to project and overstate of their impecunious status. A European’s mind 
was more pervious to believe in the accounts of Muslim/Oriental oppression on 
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the Balkans. Conversely, the Ottoman Empire was reluctant to establish a 
decentralized rule on its heterogeneous parts, despite the fact that it lacked 
educated manpower and material to realize a firm one. As the penetration of 
Europe in the Balkans intensified so did the self awareness of the Balkan peoples. 
Dubbing all the ethnic movements as political tools with European bearing would 
be a mistake. For instance, Bulgarian intelligentsia around 1870s certainly desired 
their own national state and they welcomed a Russian intervention but as their 
saviors not as their new sovereigns.3 Moreover, Europe was not in a consensus on 
the Balkan ethnicities, British Prime Minister Disraeli said autonomy would be 
less absurd for Ireland than autonomy for Bosnia.4  
 Under such conditions arrived the year of deluge. At 1875, the Ottoman 
armed forces were spread thin in the Balkans; subduing revolting Christian 
peasants in one part, halting inter-communal violence in another part while 
fighting a symmetric warfare against Serbia and Montenegro. Mahmud Nedim 
Pasha proved himself that he earned the sobriquet Nedimov rightly; due to 
Ignatiev’s manipulations he mismanaged the crisis in the Balkans, and to further 
alienate the Porte’s allies declared bankruptcy. Başıbozuks were filling for the 
army, and their bloody exploits enraged the European public opinion toward the 
Porte.  When two consuls were killed, two of their own, not in a backwater town 
but in a cosmopolitan port city which many Europeans heard of, it was the last 
straw that broke the camel’s back. 
 The Salonika Incident could have been a simple tension, without a loss of 
life but it was disaster for both humanity and for the Porte’s image in Europe. It 
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was ironic for Europe to overreact to an incident that happened in a place which 
they considered as violence as its norm. “There is far less reason for surprise that 
it should have led to the loss of two lives than that it should not have cost more” 
Ambassador Elliot pronounced, “for, even in this country say at Glasgow, Dublin, 
or Belfast if a girl about to take the veil was violently carried off by a Protestant 
mob, it would be well if the riot that would ensue did not lead to worse 
consequences.”5 Moreover, even contemporaries raised the question on extremism 
of reactions of the European powers. Benjamin Franklin Butler, former general 
for the Union in the American Civil War, made a striking remark on the Salonika 
Incident;  
[…] But a more striking recent example is an outrage similar in its facts, 
that of Salonika. In the State of Mississippi, a Negro was accused of 
stealing a cow. The Turks from Salonika who accused two Consuls 
Europeans in this city to have kidnapped a Turkish girl, and [the Muslims] 
killed them for revenge. […] In America, it suffices to rend the same 
punishment for a cow! I quote the words of the New York Herald, May 24 
"Murder of the Negroes" New Orleans 23 May 1876 "The Picayune says 
that twenty-nine Negroes were killed in the Wilkinson County (Mississippi) 
during the latest unrest here." No Christian nation has sought justice for 
the massacre. Nobody has been punished [...] No warship has been 
dispatched to the scene of the outrage to the request by the cannon, the 
punishment of murderers and indemnity for widows and orphans of 
victims. But after a conference of the Cabinet, an order was transferred to 
the Troops Commander of the United States, to intervene in order to 
prevent further bloodshed. In his report the officer said: "That all is quiet 
in the place or the case in place" which is undoubtedly true, since the 
Negroes are dead and this tells us that "The secretary of war is 
delighted.” This did not happen in Turkey but near Vicksburg, 
[somewhere] under the protection of the flag of the United States.6 
 
The Salonika Incident also reveals one other point about the society of the 
Ottoman Balkans; this could be the assertion on the lack of parallelism between 
the modernization of the superstructure of the state and the public masses. In this 
incident, despite the 37 years of emphasis since Gülhane on the equality of 
                                                 
5 Sir Henry George Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences (London: J. 
Murray, 1922), p.219-20. 
6 BOA, HR.SYS., Dosya No: 45, Gömlek No: 46, Aristarchi to Reşid Paşa. 
 88
religions in the Empire, a single agitation ignited a mass reaction even in a 
cosmopolitan European city such as Salonika.  
The roots of misperception of the Balkans lie in the Eastern Question; 
what to do with the European part of the Ottoman Empire was an ever-recurring 
question for the intelligentsia of the 19th century.7 The Balkans was terra 
incognita until the Greek Revolution. It was and still is, a place more imagined 
than visited, a synonym of a futile attempt of mixing the unmixable, a maze or a 
puzzle.8 Even after the Greek Revolution, encounters of the western travelers in 
the Balkans were filled with the reflections of their disappointments.9 Still today 
perceived by some scholars as a pejorative term; “balkanization is associated with 
ethnic territorial conflict”.10 Due to its close proximity to the West the Balkans 
was the most vulnerable part to the foreign interests and influence in Ottoman 
Empire. The availability of many Christian communities living under the Ottoman 
rule made the Balkans a rather sentimental issue for most of the Great Powers. 
The Eastern Question was for all its intent and purposes; a mental shortcut, 
a shared construction. Subjects of the Eastern Question like the ethnicities in the 
Balkans were also affected by the black and white approach which took its toll on 
the Salonika Incident. The Balkan peoples and the life in the Balkans in the 19th 
century were an imagined phenomenon for a westerner; it was a social and 
cultural construction where all communities were distinguished not by their falsity 
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of genuineness, but by the style in which they were imagined.11 There was a 
shared stereotype; suffering of Christians under the cruel and fanatic Muslim 
rulers. It was easier to see the murders at Salonika as a manifestation of Muslim 
fanaticism rather than an incident, since it was fitting flawlessly in the stereotype. 
Prejudices were not in the monopoly of the Westerners; insiders also shared this 
intersubjective constructions; “social facts” for instance, the inevitable accusation 
that Lazzaro was exposed to because of his Greek-Russian identity. The mob 
behavior labeled as “the fanaticism of the Muslims” or “traitorous Greeks”, had 
no material reality but existed only because people collectively believed they 
existed and acted accordingly.12 Lazzaro after his name was cleared was put under 
surveillance of the Ottoman Police and his acts -how innocent they may seem- 
were put under close watch.13 His name also remained as “the puppetmaster” of 
the event and echoed up to present day’s Turkish press, as a manifestation of a 
perpetual agent provocateur among the Turks, scheming to hurt the Turkish 
image.14 
                                                 
11Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comperative Politics” Annual Review of Political Science, vol.4 
(2001), p.398.  
12 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program 
in International Relations and Comperative Politics” Annual Review of Political Science, vol.4 
(2001), p.393. 
13 BOA, HR.SYS, Dosya No: 68, Gömlek No: 18, 1878. 
14 Mehmet Barlas, in his newspaper article titled “It’s Not Easy Being a Bridge Country” 
published in one of the best sellers paper of Turkey Sabah tells a very romanticized version of the 
Murders at Salonika with the repetition of blame to Lazzaro, and reaches a moral conclusion of 
that “Turkey must be careful of agitators.”  http:/
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: The incidents which resulted in the murder of French and 
German consuls at Salonika. 
 
 
Source: Sacit Kutlu, Balkanlar ve Osmanlı Devleti (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları, June 2007), p.99. 
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Appendix B: A plan drawn by Consul Blunt on the konak and the scene of 
double murders. 
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Source: Great Britain, Parliament, Commons. Parliamentary Papers, 1876: 
Turkey No. 4 (1876). Correspondence Respecting The Murder of the French and 
German Consuls at Salonica. 
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